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FORFEITING TRUST
DEBORAH S. GORDON*
ABSTRACT
Over the past two years, a significant number of appellate courts
in jurisdictions throughout the country have faced trust provisions
that purport to disinherit any beneficiaries who challenge a trustee’s
decision making. Such provisions to “secure compliance ... with di-
spositions of property”—known as “forfeiture,” “no-contest,” “anti-
contest,” or “penalty” clauses—have appeared in wills for well more
than a century. But the trust clauses differ from their testamentary
counterparts and thus deserve serious scrutiny in their own right,
especially because the abundance of recent cases has led to increas-
ingly inconsistent and haphazard approaches. This Article exposes
the problems that trust forfeiture clauses pose, in comparison to will
forfeiture clauses, and proposes some solutions.
Trusts, rather than wills, have become the primary vehicle for
property owners to distribute their valuables at death. Courts and
legislatures profess to treat trust and will forfeiture clauses identi-
cally, but doing so has resulted in significant confusion because this
approach ignores that the two donative vehicles, and the most com-
mon challenges to them, differ in fundamental ways. Indeed, wills
are most frequently contested by beneficiaries who claim the docu-
ment itself is invalid, either because it was executed without the
requisite formalities or because the testator lacked capacity, was
induced to sign the instrument against her free will, or revoked it in
favor of some alternative disposition. Typical testamentary forfeiture
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clauses seeking to prevent these types of claims therefore provide that
anyone who challenges the will forfeits any interests received under
it; if the contestant is successful, the court invalidates both the will
and the forfeiture clause. In contrast, the majority of trust litigation
arises from disagreements between the beneficiaries and the trustees
over how the latter invest, manage, and distribute property. Seeking
to incentivize beneficiaries to go along with trustee decision making,
some settlors and their advisors have purposely broadened the scope
of forfeiture clauses so that they apply not only to contests that
challenge the validity of the trust agreement but also to claims of
fiduciary misconduct or mismanagement. But a provision that
discourages breach of duty claims against trustees by dictating that
anyone who files such a claim forfeits her beneficial interest allows
fiduciaries to escape oversight, thereby forfeiting the very qualities
that define trust law in the first place.
This Article exposes the conflicting ways that courts and legisla-
tures have been grappling with these clauses that pit settlor intent
not against a general distaste for forfeiture, but instead against
fiduciary accountability. After examining the roots of this confusion,
the Article proposes a more coherent approach to trust forfeiture
clauses that recognizes property owners’ interests in facilitating
smooth relationships between their trustees and beneficiaries without
forfeiting the precious oversight that allows trusts and the parties to
a trust relationship to function properly.
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“Experience has shown that often, after the death of a [property
owner] ... contests are commenced wherein not infrequently are
brought to light matters of private life that ought never to be made
public, and in respect to which the voice of the [property owner]
cannot be heard either in explanation or denial; and, as a result, the
manifest intention of the [property owner] is thwarted. It is not
strange, in view of this, that [property owners] have desired to secure
compliance with their dispositions of property, and have sought to
incorporate provisions which should operate most powerfully to
accomplish that result.”1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a mother who has three adult children, two of whom she
sees regularly to celebrate daily triumphs and periodic disappoint-
ments and one of whom has moved far away and maintains only
erratic contact with the family. These significantly different rela-
tionships may prompt the mother to bequeath her property to the
three children in unequal shares. Whether the mother’s decision is
whimsical or justified is legally unimportant,2 because a person’s
ability to dictate how and to whom her property flows at death is
“[t]he dominant substantive principle of the law of gratuitous trans-
fers.”3 This ability is also the source of significant personal disarray
that may result when loved ones feel slighted. Indeed, of all the
legacies that a property owner can leave behind, the most valuable
is not her ancestral home, unfinished manuscript, or diamond jewel-
ry, but rather a smooth and harmonious transition of ownership,
without resentment, challenge, or contest.4 It is therefore not sur-
prising that most United States jurisdictions respect a decedent’s
1. Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 415 (1898).
2. See Harry Hibschman, Whimsies of Will-Makers, 66 U.S. L. REV. 362, 362-69 (1932)
(providing examples of whimsical wills); Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of
Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2219 (2011) (“In choosing beneficiaries, at least, a testator
can make an estate plan ‘as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, [or]
revenge can dictate.’”) (citations omitted).
3. John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105,
1109 (2004).
4. Olin L. Browder, Jr., Testamentary Conditions Against Contest, 36 MICH. L. REV. 1066,
1066 (1938) (“It is the natural desire of any testator that his will be speedily probated after
his death and that there be no rancorous bickerings over his estate by his beneficiaries.”).
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written direction that any beneficiary who “contests” that decedent’s
will forfeits the right to inherit under it.5 Such provisions to “secure
compliance with ... dispositions of property”—known as “forfeiture,”
“no-contest,” “anti-contest,” or “penalty” clauses—have appeared in
wills for well more than a century, as the 1898 Supreme Court case
quoted above indicates.6 By coupling such a clause with a gift of
some significance, a property owner can incentivize a disgruntled
beneficiary to accept what she has received and walk away, thereby
serving the “compelling”7 goals of preventing litigation, maintaining
privacy, and encouraging family harmony.8 
Over the past two years, a significant number of appellate courts
in jurisdictions throughout the country have confronted forfeiture
clauses in trusts rather than in wills.9 But because trust forfeiture
5. Martin D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final
Threat, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 630 (1994); Gerry W. Beyer et al., The Fine Art of Intimidating
Disgruntled Beneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV. 225, 227-28 (1998); see
also UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-517, 3-905 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“Penalty Clause for Con-
test”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003); JACK CHALLIS & HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, STATE LAWS: NO-CONTEST CLAUSES
(2012), http://www.actec.org/public/Documents/Studies/State_Laws_No_Contest_Clauses_-
_Chart.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ZV5-WZFQ] [hereinafter ACTEC Survey]. For examples of court
definitions of forfeiture clauses, see McGrath v. Gallant, 69 A.3d 968, 971 n.1 (Conn. App. Ct.
2013); Missouri ex rel. Bank of Am. N.A. v. Kanatzar, 413 S.W.3d 22, 24 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013).
6. Meech, 169 U.S. at 398; see also Begleiter, supra note 5, at 629 (testamentary no-
contest clauses litigated as early as 1674); Beyer et al., supra note 5, at 230-42 (describing
history of forfeiture clauses from Ancient Babylonia through the Supreme Court’s pronounce-
ment in Meech); Jack Leavitt, Scope and Effectiveness of No-Contest Clauses in Last Wills and
Testaments, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 45, 47 (1963) (similarly noting the litigation of no-contest claus-
es as early as 1674). Although the term “in terrorem clause” also applies to no-contest clauses,
this type of clause had a slightly different function historically. See Begleiter, supra note 5,
at 649-50; Browder, supra note 4, at 1092-1102; Leavitt, supra, at 48-49. 
7. Keener v. Keener, 682 S.E.2d 545, 548 (Va. 2009). 
8. See Begleiter, supra note 5, at 631-36; see also Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 555, 572-73, 572 n.113 (2008) (describing privacy advantages that result
from discouraging challenges to estates); Hirsch, supra note 2, at 2208 (“The [forfeiture]
clause discourages costly litigation that the state traditionally subsidizes and that ‘engenders
animosities and arouses hostilities among the kinfolk of the testator, which may never be put
to rest and which contribute to general unhappiness.’” (quoting Rudd v. Searles, 160 N.E. 882,
886 (Mass. 1928))).
9. See, e.g., In re Shaheen Tr., 341 P.3d 1169, 1170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015); Peterson v.
Peck, 430 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013); Donkin v. Donkin, 314 P.3d 780, 790-98 (Cal.
2013); Callaway v. Willard, 739 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Hamel v. Hamel, 299
P.3d 278, 288 (Kan. 2013); In re Estate of Stan, 839 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013);
Rouner v. Wise, 446 S.W.3d 242, 260 (Mo. 2014); In re Joseph L. Dugan Revocable Living Tr.,
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clauses purport to disinherit beneficiaries who challenge trustee
decision making, they differ significantly from their testamentary
counterparts and thus deserve serious scrutiny in their own right.
To date, however, this case law trend has gone virtually unnoticed,10
leading to an increasingly inconsistent and haphazard approach in
the courts. This inconsistency results because each of the jurisdic-
tions to confront the analytic underpinnings of a trust forfeiture
clause has searched for guidance linearly, looking back to its law on
testamentary forfeiture clauses, rather than more comprehensively.
The purpose of this Article is to expose the problems that trust
forfeiture clauses present, in comparison to will forfeiture clauses,
and to propose some solutions.
No. 60263, 2014 WL 549697, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 10, 2014); Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741, 746
(N.H. 2013); Frakes v. Nay, 295 P.3d 94, 100 (Or. 2013); Wilson v. Dallas, 743 S.E.2d 746, 761
(S.C. 2013); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-1014 (West 2013) (codifying provisions for
enforcing no-contest clauses in trust proceedings). 
10. Over the years, inheritance scholars have discussed and analyzed the treatment of
testamentary forfeiture clauses at some length. See Begleiter, supra note 5, at 631; Beyer et
al., supra note 5, at 225-27. For older articles, see generally Olin L. Browder, Jr., Testa-
mentary Conditions Against Contest Re-Examined, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 320 (1949) [hereinafter
Browder, Re-Examined]; Browder, supra note 4; Edwin C. Goddard, Forfeiture Conditions in
Wills as Penalty for Contesting Probate, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 267 (1933); Leavitt, supra note 6.
For more recent discussions of no-contest clauses, and specifically how their inconsistent
treatment reveals shortcomings with trust doctrine, see Hirsch, supra note 2, at 2207-13;
David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1732-34
(2009); Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More than Money: Mediation Clauses in
Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 563-71 (2008). The only article that
directly addresses how trust forfeiture clauses function is almost two decades old and does not
address the fiduciary issues discussed in this Article. See Jo Ann Engelhardt, In Terrorem In-
ter Vivos: Terra Incognita, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 535, 537-38 (1991). The existing liter-
ature, however, also addresses a handful of older cases (In re Andrus’ Will, 281 N.Y.S. 831
(Sur. Ct. 1935), and In re Sand’s Estate, 66 Pa. D. & C. 551 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct., 1948)) involving
forfeiture clauses that were broad enough to bar challenges to fiduciary conduct. See Beyer
et al., supra note 5, at 244 (discussing Andrus and Sand as cases involving overbroad
forfeiture clauses); Horton, supra, at 1733 (citing Andrus as an example of a case in which a
bright-line public policy proscription could work to nullify no-contest clauses that apply to
breach of trust allegations); Leavitt, supra note 6, at 56 (discussing Andrus and Sand as cases
involving “invalid” forfeiture clauses). 
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Trusts,11 rather than wills, have become the primary vehicle for
property owners—known as settlors—to distribute their valuables
at death.12 Although courts and legislatures profess to treat trust
and will forfeiture clauses identically,13 doing so has resulted in
significant confusion because this approach ignores that the two
donative vehicles, and the most common challenges to them, differ
in fundamental ways.14 Wills are most frequently contested by bene-
ficiaries who claim the document itself is invalid, either because the
testator executed it without the requisite formalities, lacked the
required capacity, was induced to sign the instrument against her
free will, or revoked it in favor of some alternative disposition.15
Typical testamentary forfeiture clauses seeking to prevent these
types of claims therefore provide that anyone who challenges the
11. Trusts provide a custodial and management mechanism by which one party, known
as the settlor (or grantor, donor, or creator), empowers another, known as the trustee, to hold,
administer, and distribute property for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries. See Jeffrey
A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and the Future of Trust
Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 n.1 (2008). Although there are many different
types of trusts, including charitable and business trusts, this Article focuses on the private
donative trust. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625, 630-31 (1995). 
12. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 385 (9th ed.
2013); John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984). 
13. See Ackerman v. Genevieve Ackerman Family Tr., 908 A.2d 1200, 1203 (D.C. 2006);
Hamel, 299 P.3d at 288; Keener v. Keener, 682 S.E.2d 545, 548 (Va. 2009); GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 181, at 248 n.5 (2d ed. 1979); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 cmt. i (AM. LAW
INST. 2003)  (“With the increase in the use of revocable inter vivos trusts as will substitutes,
no-contest clauses ... restraining challenges of particular provisions in those trusts serve the
same purpose as do such clauses in wills, and the same test applies to determine the validity
of those clauses in the two comparable situations.”); Engelhardt, supra note 10, at 560-61
(describing how the few decided cases to discuss forfeiture clauses in trusts “support the
proposition that courts will construe an in terrorem clause the same in a will as in a trust” and
that “[c]ommentators have reached the same conclusion”); Joyce Moore, Will Contests from
Start to Finish, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 97, 122-23 (2012) (describing how the “scant” jurisdictions
to address no-contest clauses in trusts appeared to treat them “similar to no-contest clauses
found in wills”). But see, e.g., In re Griffin Revocable Grantor Tr., 765 N.W.2d 613, 613 (Mich.
2009) (reversing appellate court to hold that a statute’s probable cause standard applicable
to will forfeiture clauses did not apply to trust forfeiture clauses). 
14. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 5,
2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 (AM. LAW
INST. 2003); Browder, Re-Examined, supra note 10, at 328.
462 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:455
will forfeits any interests received under it; if the contestant is suc-
cessful, the will (including the clause) is invalidated.16
Perhaps because most trusts last for far longer than the adminis-
tration of most estates,17 the majority of trust litigation—and there
is plenty—arises from disagreements between the beneficiaries and
the trustees over how the trustees invest, manage, and distribute
the property rather than from qualms with the trust agreement’s
initial validity.18 Seeking to incentivize beneficiaries to go along
with trustee decision making, some settlors and their advisors have
purposely broadened the scope of forfeiture clauses so that they ap-
ply not only to contests that challenge the validity of the trust
agreement but also to claims of fiduciary misconduct or mismanage-
ment.19 But a provision that discourages breach of duty claims
against trustees by dictating that anyone who files such a claim will
forfeit her beneficial interest allows fiduciaries to escape oversight,
thereby forfeiting the very qualities that define trust law in the first
place. 
This Article exposes the conflicting ways that courts and legisla-
tures have been grappling with these clauses that pit settlor intent,
not against a general distaste for forfeiture, but instead against fi-
duciary accountability, and it proposes solutions both for those who
are planning trusts and for those who are interpreting them. The
Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes forfeiture clauses
generally, including how they have been triggered by beneficiaries’
challenges to will validity although not by requests for document
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
INHERITANCE LAW 113 (2009).
18. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 541, 701, 963, 966. 
19. See, e.g., In re Shaheen Tr., 341 P.3d 1169, 1170-71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015); Peterson v.
Peck, 430 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013); Bradley v. Gilbert, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680, 682-
84 (Ct. App. 2009); Callaway v. Willard, 739 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Hamel v.
Hamel, 299 P.3d 278, 289 (Kan. 2013); In re Dugan Revocable Living Tr., No. 60263, 2014 WL
549697, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 10, 2014); see also In re Estate of Stan, 839 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2013); Frakes v. Nay, 295 P.3d 94, 100 (Or. 2013); Wilson v. Dallas, 743 S.E.2d 746,
761 (S.C. 2013); infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. That is not to say that the issue
of fiduciary misconduct never arose before. See Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2004) (cited in current draft provision of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS)); infra
notes 162-65 and accompanying text (discussing a 1935 New York case rejecting a forfeiture
clause that purported to be triggered by challenges to trustee decision making). However, this
recent onslaught of cases is noteworthy. 
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clarification and construction. It then briefly surveys different
jurisdictions’ standards for enforcing traditional (in other words,
testamentary) forfeiture clauses. Part II looks at the important role
management trusts have come to play in estate planning in order to
explain why forfeiture clauses are appearing in trust agreements
with increasing frequency and how trusts’ divided ownership and
long-term duration affect those clauses.
Part III describes recent cases that have tried to negotiate the two
important interests that trust forfeiture clauses put at odds—settlor
intent and trustee accountability—with vastly different and mostly
confusing results. This Part also describes legislative attempts to
address trust forfeiture clauses, including a draft provision in the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts. Part IV proposes a more coherent
and balanced approach to trust forfeiture clauses, both from a
forward-looking (or planning) and a backward-looking (or adminis-
trative) perspective. This Part cautions against including these
provisions regularly and advocates for treating the clauses as
presumptively invalid but not void. The burden-shifting approach
that this Article proposes acknowledges the settlor’s interest in
facilitating a smooth relationship between her fiduciary and bene-
ficiaries without forfeiting the precious oversight that allows trusts
to function properly. 
I. WILLS AND FORFEITURE CLAUSES
With testamentary intent as the driving force of inheritance law,20
it is not surprising that the vast majority of jurisdictions allow a
property owner to disinherit a beneficiary who chooses to contest an
estate plan.21 Many jurisdictions have cautioned that such clauses
must be strictly construed22 and have restricted the settlor’s “dead
20. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 633; see also infra note 32. For citations to additional
articles, cases, and texts setting forth this principle, see Deborah S. Gordon, Reflecting on the
Language of Death, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 379, 382 n.13 (2011). For an analysis of how other
doctrines trump this professed priority, see Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary
Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236 (1996).
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmts. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft
No. 5, 2009); Begleiter, supra note 5, at 629; Beyer et al., supra note 5, at 227, 242-43; Hirsch,
supra note 2, at 2207; see also infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text. 
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hand” power by refusing to allow disinheritance of a beneficiary who
has brought a contest in “good faith” or with “probable cause.”23
While some scholars have argued that anything short of absolute
enforcement of forfeiture clauses threatens to eviscerate the pur-
poses of such clauses altogether,24 property owners continue to
include forfeiture clauses in their testamentary documents25 and
courts continue to disinherit beneficiaries as a result of them.26
These clauses therefore have proven to be a powerful tool for strik-
ing a balance between testators’ donative freedom, including the
understandable desire to discourage wasteful and vexatious litiga-
tion, and the probate system’s interest in enforcing wills that are,
in fact, valid. 
A. Background and Purposes
Forfeiture clauses are designed to dissuade dissatisfied beneficia-
ries from disrupting an estate plan.27 Although infinitely varied, a
typical forfeiture clause will provide: 
If any beneficiary under this Will shall in any manner contest or
attack this Will or any of its provisions, then in such event any
share or interest in my estate given to such contesting benefi-
ciary under this Will is hereby revoked and shall be disposed of
in the same manner provided herein as if such contesting bene-
ficiary had predeceased me.28
23. See infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
24. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 679; see also Beyer et al., supra note 5, at 245-47 (describing
cases treating forfeiture clauses as valid without exception); Hirsch, supra note 2, at 2209-10
(describing inefficiencies and hindsight bias that the probable cause rule produces). 
25. See, e.g., Hamm v. Hamm, 429 S.W.3d 384, 387 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013); Stewart v.
Ciccaglione, No. CV074008040S, 2014 WL 1647035, at *1 n.1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 26,
2014); Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); In re Estate of Prevratil, 990
N.Y.S.2d 697, 703-04 (App. Div. 2014); see also supra note 9 (citing cases).
26. See, e.g., Norton v. Norton, 744 S.E.2d 790, 791 (Ga. 2013) (affirming summary
judgment disinheriting beneficiaries based on forfeiture clause); Nickles v. Spisak, No. 2013-
P-0094, 2014 WL 2882429, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 23, 2014) (affirming probate court’s
disinheritance of beneficiaries who contested will because “[n]o contest clauses in wills and
other testamentary documents are ... strictly enforced”).
27. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 633-40; Foster, supra note 8, at 572-73, 672 n.113.
28. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 45 (quoting BANK OF AM., SUGGESTED PROVISIONS FOR WILLS
AND TRUSTS 21 (3d ed. 1960)); see also, e.g., Norman v. Gober, 737 S.E.2d 309, 310 n.1 (Ga.
2013) (“Should any beneficiary contest or initiate legal proceedings to contest the validity of
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The clauses are directed towards the most common types of will “at-
tacks,” which contest the validity of the testamentary instrument or
any of its components.29 
When a court considers whether to enforce a forfeiture clause and
thereby sever the interests of a beneficiary who has filed or partici-
pated in a contest, the court often will discuss two overarching but
diametrically opposed policies30: inheritance law’s respect for testa-
mentary freedom, and equity’s distaste for forfeiture.31 In favor of
enforcing the clause and disinheriting the beneficiary is the often-
repeated and well-entrenched rule that prioritizes donative intent
above other concerns.32 Because a property owner can manifest that
this Will or any provision herein or to prevent any provision from being carried out in
accordance with its terms (whether or not in good faith and with probable cause), then all the
benefits provided for such contesting beneficiary, and any such beneficiary’s descendants, in
this Will are revoked and annulled.”); Prevratil, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 704 (providing for revocation
of any bequest to any beneficiary who “contest[s] the probate or validity of [the] Will or any
provision thereof, or ... institute[s] ... any proceeding to ... prevent any provision [of the Will]
from being carried out in accordance with its terms”); Begleiter, supra note 5, at 629 (“In the
event that any provision of this my last will and testament is contested by any of the parties
mentioned herein, the portion or portions of the estate to which such party or parties would
be entitled shall be disposed of in the same manner as though their name or names had not
been mentioned herein.” (quoting Barry v. Am. Sec. & Tr. Co., 135 F.2d 470, 471 (D.C. Cir.
1943))).
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmt. e, reporter’s notes (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
A challenge to a document component, rather than to the entire document, prompts the
additional question of what happens if the contestant successfully invalidates the component
but the instrument (including its forfeiture clause) otherwise stands; theoretically, the mere
filing of the contest might trigger forfeiture regardless of the contest’s outcome. But see
Begleiter, supra note 5, at 645 (“[R]arely will a contest be successful but the no-contest clause
be held valid.”). Of course, a carefully drafted forfeiture clause, a well-drafted statute, or even
a probable cause standard can temper this drastic result. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3329(b)(2) (West 2006) (providing that a no-contest clause is unenforceable if asserted on the
basis of “[a]ny action in which the beneficiary is determined by the court to have prevailed
substantially”). 
30. See Horton, supra note 10, at 1733-34 (describing how “forceful arguments lurk on
both sides of the policy ledger”). 
31. See, e.g., Peterson v. Peck, 430 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013) (“Our supreme
court has recognized the validity of no-contest clauses since at least 1937.... However, because
such clauses work a forfeiture, they are strictly construed.”) (citations omitted); In re Estate
of Stan, 839 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (finding “in terrorem clauses ... generally
valid and enforceable” but requiring that they be “strictly construed”). 
32. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 631, 633-34 (describing “the great importance the law
places on freedom of testation” and its effects on analysis of no-contest clauses); Daniel B.
Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1125, 1134 (2013) (“American succession law privileges ‘donor’s intention’ as the
‘controlling consideration’ in determining the meaning of a donative document.” (quoting
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intent by disinheriting whomever she chooses, unless a specific stat-
utory provision bars such dispossession,33 she also can place a condi-
tion on a bequest, such as one that prohibits a contest, so long as the
condition does not violate public policy.34 The rationale is that
conditioning the bequest is something less than complete disinheri-
tance and gives the beneficiary a choice to accept or reject the con-
dition (and the property).35 Other justifications for forfeiture clauses
in wills include that “upholding ... such clauses avoids wasting the
testator’s estate by discouraging needless litigation”36 and that a
testator “should be able to avoid having details of his private life
made public when he cannot be heard in explanation.”37
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW
INST. 2003))); see also, e.g., Rollins v. Rollins, 755 S.E.2d 727, 730 (Ga. 2014) (“[T]he cardinal
rule in trust law is that the intention of the settlor is to be followed.”); Carter v. Carter, 965
N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct.) (“A court’s primary concern in interpreting a trust
instrument is to discover the intent of the grantor, which the court will effectuate if it is not
contrary to law or public policy.”); In re G.B. Van Dusen Marital Tr., 834 N.W.2d 514, 520
(Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (“A court’s purpose in interpreting a trust agreement is to ascertain and
give effect to the grantor’s intent.”) (quotations omitted); Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741, 746
(N.H. 2013) (“[W]hen we construe a trust instrument, ‘the intention of a settlor is
paramount.’” (quoting Appeal of Lowy, 156 N.H. 57, 61 (2007))); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d
840, 842 (Tex. 2013) (“[W]e enforce trust restrictions on the basis of the settlor’s intent.”).
33. The most obvious type of restriction on disinheritance is the spousal right of election.
See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 2222-33. 
34. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 631; see also Goddard, supra note 10, at 269 (“The right to
give and the right to take are creatures of the law, subject to the determination of the
legislature in statutes and of the courts in matters not covered by statutes but involving
questions of public policy.”); Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1367 (2011) (“[A] robust theory of testation includes within it the right
to condition legacies on personal, arbitrary, and sometimes ill-advised and foolish motives.”);
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary
Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1276-77 (discussing
testamentary restraints); Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexi-
bility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 453 (2006) (describing incentive trusts); cf.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.7 (8th ed. 2011) (suggesting that courts
should have the power to modify testamentary conditions because the testator cannot
“recontract” with a beneficiary); Hirsch, supra note 2, at 2244-48 (discussing Posner’s thesis).
For cases involving conditional bequests, see In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill.
2009); Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1955); In re Silverstein’s Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d
598 (Sur. Ct. 1956); Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E. 2d 825, 826 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
1974).
35. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 655-57 (arguing that forfeiture clauses do not actually effect
forfeitures but simply condition a beneficiary’s receipt of assets to which she is not entitled
on the beneficiary’s acquiescence to the terms of the gift). 
36. Id. at 631; see also Browder, supra note 4, at 1073.
37. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 631.
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On the other hand, courts construe forfeiture clauses “strictly and
narrowly” based on the equally pervasive idea that “equity abhors
a forfeiture.”38 Whether this phrase is, as Professor Martin Begleiter
claims, a conclusory reference to a narrow and inapplicable contract
doctrine39 or, more broadly, an expression of concern that litigants
receive procedural (and not just substantive) fairness,40 it has justi-
fied a narrower view of forfeiture clauses’ reach. To the extent that
a beneficiary “plainly and palpably [fits] within the scope of the
forfeiture clause” a court is not to quibble over or “put a strained or
overtechnical construction” on the clause’s language to allow that
person to “escape the penalty of forfeiture” by “some hook or
crook.”41 But mindful of the potentially extreme result of such a
clause, which effectively deprives a beneficiary of the opportunity to
claim property she believes is rightfully hers, a court will take a
conservative approach in deciding whether the specific language of
the clause applies to the precise “contest” that the beneficiary has
mounted.42 As Professor Jack Leavitt noted some years ago when
discussing this policy of strict construction, one court, for example,
even declined to enforce a forfeiture clause against a beneficiary
who participated in a will contest that had been filed some months
earlier because the clause stated that it applied to beneficiaries who
“instituted” challenges, and the beneficiary in question simply
joined an ongoing contest.43 The rationale harkens back to donative
intent: “if the testator had wished the loss of the beneficiary’s
38. Id. at 630. 
39. Id. at 655-56. Professor Begleiter traces the origin of this often-repeated phrase to a
commercial setting where, responding to abuses of penal bonds, debtors were not penalized
by forfeitures of their entire estates but rather had to pay their “true debt and damages,” so
long as pecuniary damages provided adequate relief. Id. Because the phrase originated in a
narrow contractual context, Begleiter argues, it does not translate fluidly to the law of
gratuitous transfers. Id. 
40. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 10, at 1732-33 (describing one “critical value” that no-
contest clauses implicate is an individual’s right to “access courts freely”).
41. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 72 (citing In re Kitchen, 220 P. 301, 303 (Cal. 1923)).
42. Moore, supra note 13, at 118; see also Browder, supra note 4, at 1067 (“It is extremely
important to bear in mind that the legality of a condition can be determined only with
reference to its application, i.e., with reference to the particular facts and the grounds of
contest.”); Leavitt, supra note 6, at 46 (“Since forfeitures are disfavored by the courts, the no-
contest clause is strictly construed to prevent this result whenever possible. Only if the acts
of the party come strictly within the express terms of the punitive clause is the breach
declared.”).
43. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 46.
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bequest to result from the conduct at issue, the testator could have
drafted the will to accomplish that result.”44
B. Enforceability of Testamentary Forfeiture Clauses:
Jurisdictional Variations
These overarching policies—donative freedom but conservative
construction—have led to variations for enforcement of will forfei-
ture clauses based on how a jurisdiction prioritizes the competing
interests. Only two states—Florida and Indiana—refuse to recog-
nize forfeiture clauses at all as a matter of public policy.45 Georgia
requires, as a prerequisite to enforcement of a forfeiture clause, that
the property owner include a gift-over clause specifying what is to
become of the disinherited beneficiary’s share.46 
In contrast to these restrictive approaches that limit the influence
of forfeiture clauses and thus the testator’s power to incentivize
44. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 675 (citing In re Estate of Watson, 223 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17-18
(Ct. App. 1986)); see also In re Estate of Goyette, 66 Cal. Rptr. 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1968);
Liggett v. Liggett, 108 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Mo. 1937); In re Cronin’s Will, 257 N.Y.S. 496, 504
(Sur. Ct. 1932), aff ’d, 261 N.Y.S. 936 (App. Div. 1936).
45. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 2014) (“A provision in a will purporting to penal-
ize any interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating to
the estate is unenforceable.”); id. § 736.1108 (“A provision in a trust instrument purporting
to penalize any interested person for contesting the trust instrument or instituting other pro-
ceedings relating to a trust estate or trust assets is unenforceable.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-
2 (West 2014) (“If, in any will admitted to probate in any of the courts of this state, there is
a provision or provisions providing that if any beneficiary thereunder shall take any proceed-
ing to contest such will or to prevent the admission thereof to probate, or provisions to that
effect, such beneficiary shall thereby forfeit any benefit which said will made for said benefic-
iary, such provision or provisions shall be void and of no force or effect.”). 
46. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-68 (West 1996); Cox v. Fowler, 614 S.E.2d 59, 61 (Ga. 2005).
Although New Hampshire and Mississippi appear to have had this same requirement at some
point in time, see Pringle v. Dunkley, 22 Miss. 16 (1850); Burtman v. Butman, 85 A.2d 892,
894 (N.H. 1952), neither jurisdiction follows this approach today. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 564-B:10-1014 (2011); In re Estate of Thomas, 28 So. 3d 627, 638 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), cert.
denied, 27 So. 3d 404 (2010). Vermont has no law on the enforceability of no-contest clauses.
See ACTEC Survey, supra note 5, at 1. Alabama has yet to decide on the standard that it ap-
plies to enforceability. Although Alabama courts have recognized the validity of forfeiture
clauses, none have found a clause to apply to the specific contest in question. See, e.g., Har-
rison v. Morrow, 977 So. 2d 457, 459 (Ala. 2007) (“We need not determine whether in terrorem
clauses are unenforceable in Alabama when their enforceability is specifically challenged,
because we conclude that the will contest did not fall within the proscriptions of the in
terrorem provision in this case.”).
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harmony among her heirs and ensure compliance with her wishes,47
a sizable minority of states enforce the clauses absolutely, so that
any beneficiary who brings a “contest,” as defined in the language
of the instrument, will be disinherited if the will turns out to be
valid and admissible.48 These jurisdictions do not look at the benefic-
iary’s factual basis for contesting the testamentary instrument. If
the beneficiary’s claims fail, she forfeits her inheritance regardless
of whether she had a valid reason for complaining; if she succeeds
in discrediting the will, of course, the entire document—including
its forfeiture clause—will be struck down, and the property will pass
either through intestacy or pursuant to the terms of an earlier in-
strument.49 This approach encourages beneficiaries to think seri-
ously about the merits of their claims before filing suit, although
threat of disinheritance has less impact on beneficiaries who receive
only token bequests (and therefore have less to lose).50 The threat
also may dissuade needier or risk-averse beneficiaries from suing,
even if their qualms are valid.51 
Most states take an intermediate position on will forfeiture claus-
es, recognizing and enforcing them unless the beneficiary who has
contested the document had “probable cause” to initiate the
challenge.52 In this context, “[p]robable cause exists when, at the
time of instituting the proceeding, there was evidence that would
lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to
conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that the challenge
47. See Beyer et al., supra note 5, at 227 (“Under a typical in terrorem provision, the
beneficiary is presented with a choice of either (1) accepting the gift under the will or trust,
or (2) contesting the instrument with the hope of upsetting the testator’s or settlor’s intended
disposition and, instead, receiving a greater share of property through intestacy, under a prior
will, or via some other means, but with the concomitant risk of triggering a forfeiture of all
benefits if the contest fails.”).
48. Id. at 245; see also ACTEC Survey, supra note 5, at 2 (listing District of Columbia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming as states that enforce no-contest clauses absolutely). 
49. Hirsch, supra note 2, at 2209.
50. Id. at 2211 (“[I]f a testator leaves potential contestants nothing under a will, a no-
contest clause becomes toothless because would-be contestants have nothing to lose by bring-
ing the contest.”).
51. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
52. Beyer et al., supra note 5, at 247-49 (citing cases); ACTEC Survey, supra note 5, at 2,
5 (listing jurisdictions).
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would be successful.”53 If the contest fails and the will is admitted
to probate, a beneficiary who had adequate reason to bring the con-
test54 will not be deprived of her bequest.55 Although this compro-
mise approach has been criticized as incurring additional costs and
undermining testator intent,56 it is the approach that both the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute favor.57 The primary policy justification for
refusing to disinherit a beneficiary who has “probable cause” to con-
test a will, even if her claim ultimately does not succeed, is that the
beneficiary is providing the court with knowledge that helps the
court ascertain whether the will should be probated.58 Other justifi-
cations include a reluctance to restrict the beneficiary’s access to the
courts and a desire to protect the interests of vulnerable beneficia-
ries.59 Because the outcome of a will contest is often tremendously
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 cmt.
c (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-47 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-2-517 (West 2014); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.  ANN. § 2521 (West 2014); In re Estate
of Shumway, 9 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Ariz. 2000); In re Estate of Peppler, 971 P.2d 694, 697 (Colo.
App. 1998); In re Estate of Campbell, 876 P.2d 212, 216 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Hannam v.
Brown, 956 P.2d 794, 799 (Nev. 1998); Winningham v. Winningham, 966 S.W.2d 48, 52-53
(Tenn. 1998). The Restatement explains that the evidence needed should be less where there
is strong public policy supporting the legal ground of the contest or attack. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 2003)
A factor which bears on the existence of probable cause is that the beneficiary relied upon the
advice of disinterested counsel sought in good faith after a full disclosure of the facts. Id. 
54. Some jurisdictions speak of the exception applying if the contestant brought the chal-
lenge in “good faith.” See, e.g., Seymour v. Biehslich, 266 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Ark. 2007); In re
Estate of Mank, 699 N.E.2d 1103, 1107-09 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). Others require good faith and
probable cause. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.005(4) (West 2013); Griffin v. Sturges, 40 A.2d
758, 762-63 (Conn. 1944); In re Cocklin’s Estate, 17 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Iowa 1945); Ryan v.
Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 70 S.E.2d 853, 855-57 (N.C. 1952); In re Estate of Massey, 964 P.2d
238, 241 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998); Dutterer v. Logan, 137 S.E. 1, 1-3 (W. Va. 1927). Texas dis-
cusses the requirements in terms of both “just cause” and good faith. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 112.038 (West 2013).
55. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 641. The Mississippi Supreme Court recently held that the
probable cause standard applies even though the no-contest clause itself states that forfeiture
will occur regardless of whether the beneficiary acts in good faith and with probable cause.
Parker v. Benoist, No. 2012-CA-02010-SCT, 2015 WL 691300, at *1 (Miss. Feb. 19, 2015).
56. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 631-34; Hirsch, supra note 2, at 2209-10. 
57. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-517, 3-905 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 (AM. LAW
INST. 1983).
58. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 641; Beyer et al., supra note 5, at 247-48.
59. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 632, 645-48.
2015] FORFEITING TRUST 471
difficult to predict, especially when a beneficiary is claiming undue
influence over an elderly or infirm testator,60 this approach uses the
probable cause standard (or a variant on it) to temper the harsh
result of total disinheritance while respecting the testator’s interest
in discouraging litigation.61 
In addition to these general but jurisdiction-dependent approach-
es to traditional forfeiture clauses, there are several categories of
will challenges that historically have not triggered disinheritance,
regardless of whether the contestant had sufficient reason to file a
lawsuit. First, any challenge to a will brought by a beneficiary in
her fiduciary capacity typically does not result in that beneficiary
losing her inheritance.62 In other words, if a beneficiary who is also
an executor seeks to discredit a provision of the will, courts have
reasoned that her position as a fiduciary, rather than as a benefi-
ciary, burdens her with the obligation to raise questions about the
document’s legality that do not serve the testator’s purposes of dis-
couraging litigation.63 The fiduciary is simply doing the job assigned
to her by the testator—effectuating rather than disrupting the
estate plan—even if the challenge provides her with a personal
benefit.64 
Second, a proceeding to determine the meaning of provisions
in a will, otherwise known as a construction proceeding, ordinar-
ily does not trigger forfeiture.65 The primary justification for dis-
tinguishing this type of action is that it involves beneficiaries who
60. See Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should Be
Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 245 (2010) (“[U]ndue influence fails to meet any standard
of clarity, fairness, or predictability that a legal doctrine should satisfy.”); see also Gordon,
supra note 20, at 413-14 (describing competing stories that populate undue influence claims).
61. States often have a preliminary review mechanism in place—in the nature of a
probable cause hearing or a “safe harbor” proceeding—to determine whether a contest, if filed,
would trigger the forfeiture clause. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.5(b)(2)(D)
(McKinney 2014) (safe harbor proceeding); In re Miller Osborne Perry Tr., 831 N.W.2d 251,
253 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (describing declaratory judgment action to determine probable
cause). See generally Donkin v. Donkin, 314 P.3d 780, 790 (Cal. 2013) (describing why Cali-
fornia eliminated “safe harbor” proceedings).
62. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 668.
63. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 76.
64. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 668; Leavitt, supra note 6, at 76.
65. Browder, Re-Examined, supra note 10, at 321-22 (describing difficulty in distin-
guishing construction action from contest); Leavitt, supra note 6, at 73 (citing cases chrono-
logically from 1898 to 1961 so holding).
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are seeking to clarify what the testator actually meant and therefore
to implement, rather than impede, the testator’s intent.66 In re-
sponse to this argument, though, Professor Begleiter has pointed
out that these construction actions are not “altruistic attempt[s] to
ascertain ... true intention” but rather are an attempt by the bene-
ficiaries “to create an ambiguity and to take more for themselves.”67
Nevertheless, many statutes, cases, and clauses expressly exempt
“construction proceedings” from the definition of “contest.”68
The third category that traditionally has not triggered forfeiture,
and the most pertinent to this Article, involves actions by beneficia-
ries who are asking a court to remove an executor or to order an
accounting of estate assets.69 Because these cases frequently involve
clauses, like the one quoted at the beginning of this section, that
prohibit attacks to the will or any of its provisions, courts have
reasoned that actions challenging some aspect of estate administra-
tion do not fall within the prohibition of “contests” to the will.70
Where, however, the word “contest” is interpreted more liberally,
courts have refused to disinherit a beneficiary who requests an ac-
counting or criticizes an executor based on the rationale that the
66. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 653-54, 672-75.
67. Id. at 673.
68. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.005(3)(c) (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 551:22(III)(d) (2007); Estate of Strader, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649, 655 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[A]
petition seeking to interpret a will does not ordinarily violate a no contest clause.”); Griffin
v. Sturges, 40 A.2d 758, 760 (Conn. 1944) (“Where an action is brought to secure an inter-
pretation of a will, an assertion by any beneficiary of the construction which he believes to be
the correct one is not a contest as that expression is used in the will before us, because he is
merely seeking to give effect to the real intent of the testator.”); Railey v. Skaggs, 212 So. 2d
86, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (interpreting a provision providing that the no-contest clause
“shall not be construed to limit the appearance by any beneficiary as a witness in any
proceeding for the probate of this will, nor limit his appearance in any capacity in a
proceeding for its construction”); Va. Found. of Indep. Colls. v. Goodrich, 436 S.E.2d 418, 420
(Va. 1993) (“As a general principle, one who seeks the guidance of a court in interpreting a
provision in a will is not considered to have ‘contested’ the will in a manner which would
actuate a forfeiture clause.”); see also Love & Sterk, supra note 10, at 565 (“Of course, a no
contest clause could be drafted more broadly to encompass [claims concerning construction],
but many testators and their lawyers would be uncomfortable with a clause so broad that it
forecloses litigation over genuine and unintended ambiguities in the will.”).
69. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Sinclair, 670 S.E.2d 59, 61 (Ga. 2008).
70. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 670 (citing and summarizing cases). Some of the recent
cases involving narrow forfeiture clauses that appear in trusts use this reasoning. See
Commonwealth Bank & Tr. Co. v. Young, 361 S.W.3d 344, 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012); Keener
v. Keener, 682 S.E.2d 545, 549 (Va. 2009).
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testator could not have intended to insulate the fiduciary from her
obligation to disclose what she is doing and from accountability gen-
erally.71 
An important difference between these will cases and the trust
cases that have arisen recently and are discussed in Part III below
is that estate planners have expanded the breadth of the forfeiture
clauses that are appearing in trust agreements,72 thereby clarifying
that the property owners do intend the clauses to apply to contests
that question both document validity and ongoing fiduciary con-
duct.73 Faced with this express language and display of intent,
courts and legislatures have had to decide whether these conditions
that settlors impose on beneficiaries’ initial and continued right to
receive property under a trust are valid when the conditions con-
strain, to some degree, the beneficiaries’ ability to police their
trustees. 
II. INTER VIVOS TRUSTS AND MODERN ESTATE PLANNING
Where forfeiture clauses were once less common in trust agree-
ments than in wills,74 recent case law reveals settlors’ rapidly in-
creasing reliance on these clauses to deter trust beneficiaries from
mounting challenges.75 This evolution is natural and expected,
71. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 670 (citing Jackson v. Braden, 717 S.W.2d 206 (Ark. 1986)
(“In those cases where the beneficiary alleged mismanagement or other errors in the
administration of the estate, the courts have unvaryingly held that such objections do not
violate the no-contest clause.”)); see also In re Estate of Kruse, 86 Cal. Rptr. 491, 494 (Ct. App.
1970); In re Miller’s Estate, 41 Cal. Rptr. 410, 416-18 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Estate of Robbins,
544 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429-30 (Sur. Ct., 1989). But see Browder, Re-Examined, supra note 10, at
340 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (pointing out that few
early cases rejected forfeiture clauses that intermeddled with executors and that the Amer-
ican Law Institute had taken “the position that such a [broad] restraint” is generally “valid”)).
72. See infra Parts II, III.
73. But see supra notes 10, 19 (describing several older cases and articles involving broad
no-contest clauses rejected for public policy reasons).
74. See Engelhardt, supra note 10, at 542 (“Limited case law and virtually no statutory
law addresses the enforcement of in terrorem clauses in trusts. Nevertheless, the reasons
prompting the use of these clauses in wills—to protect the grantor’s wishes, to avoid litigation,
or to place an absolute limit on a beneficiary’s interest in assets—also apply to trusts.”); see
also Beyer et al., supra note 5, at 228 (recognizing that, as of 1998, “[i]n Texas, as in most
states, there is virtually no statutory law and very little case law addressing in terrorem
clauses in inter vivos trusts”).
75. See supra notes 9, 19.
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because a forfeiture clause that appears solely in a will is likely to
have little effect on a beneficiary’s conduct when the decedent’s
assets “pour”76 from the estate into the trust and are allocated
among the beneficiaries by means of the trust agreement.77 But
trusts differ from wills because they usually last for an extended
period of time and because, during that period, they vest ownership
and control of the property in the hands of a trustee.78 Indeed, the
fiduciary relationship between the property’s legal owner—the
trustee—and the property’s beneficial owners is the cornerstone of
trust law.79 The rising use of expansive trust forfeiture clauses is
problematic because by disinheriting beneficiaries who seek over-
sight of this fiduciary relationship, the clauses threaten to forfeit
trust altogether. The balance of this Part describes the rise of the
management trust in modern estate planning, including this
donative vehicle’s benefits and challenges and, in particular, how
those characteristics have resulted in trust forfeiture clauses that
are far broader than their will counterparts and forbearers.
A. The Inter Vivos Trust in Modern Estate Planning: Benefits
Although trusts have been around since the thirteenth century,80
the modern era of succession has seen the revocable inter vivos trust
rival the will as the primary vehicle for transmitting wealth at
death.81 There are many reasons for this shift, even in modest es-
76. Beyer et al., supra note 5, at 228-29 (“Where a will pours over into an established
trust, at least one court has refused to apply the in terrorem clause in the will to a contest
directed at the trust. Consequently, the settlor or testator who wants to avoid contests should
include an in terrorem clause in both instruments.”); Engelhardt, supra note 10, at 561
(“Estate planners frequently use pour-over wills to consolidate an individual’s estate planning
vehicles into a single dispositive plan. This technique creates an inter vivos trust ... into which
flow assets passing under a will, life insurance proceeds, or pension plan benefits. An individ-
ual can create either a funded or a ‘dry’ inter vivos trust, depending on the purpose for which
it was created.”). 
77. See Engelhardt, supra note 10, at 542-43, 561-62. 
78. See infra Part II.A-C.
79. See infra Part II.A-B.
80. See 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER,
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 1.4 (5th ed. 2006) [hereinafter SCOTT ON TRUSTS].
81. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 385; Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the
Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 717-18 (2006);
Langbein, supra note 12, at 1108-09.
2015] FORFEITING TRUST 475
tates where planning to avoid taxes is less important. The most
well-known advantage, touted by the do-it-yourself community,82 is
that assets held in a trust do not pass through probate and thus
avoid the administrative inconvenience for which some jurisdic-
tions’ probate courts are famous.83 Almost as popular a reason for
using a trust rather than a will to divide and disburse assets is the
privacy these vehicles afford.84 Thus, although the public has scru-
tinized and dissected estates of celebrities like Michael Jackson,
Robin Williams, and Joan Rivers, the specifics of these public fig-
ures’ plans have remained private because each has used a trust—
revocable during life but fixed at death—to distribute and presum-
ably manage assets.85 Inter vivos trusts also provide greater ongoing
jurisdictional flexibility than testamentary trusts, allowing a trust’s
situs to be shifted should doing so become useful.86 
Benefits that stem specifically from the management aspects of
inter vivos trusts provide additional reasons for the popularity of
these planning devices. If a settlor decides to fund her trust during
life, the trustee can help manage the assets without court interven-
tion even if the settlor’s ability to manage them herself diminishes,
thereby ensuring continuity and avoiding the costs and administra-
82. See, e.g., NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE 13-15 (1965); see also Horton,
supra note 10, at 1715-21 (describing trust mills and do-it-yourself drafting movement).
83. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 468. Relatedly, as compared with testamen-
tary trusts, stand-alone trusts avoid continued probate court supervision, which often requires
formal (and expensive) periodic accountings. Id.
84. See Foster, supra note 8, at 564-66; Foster, supra note 81, at 714-15. 
85. See Zach O’Malley Greenburg, The Scandalously Boring Truth About Michael
Jackson’s Will, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalley
greenburg/2012/08/17/the-scandalously-boring-truth-about-michael-jacksons-will/ [http://
perma.cc /AA55-GYZ7]; Danielle Mayoras & Andy Mayoras, Joan Rivers’ Estate Planning Was
No Laughing Matter, PROBATE LAW. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.probatelawyerblog.
com/2014/12/joan-rivers-estate-planning-was-no-laughing-matter.html#more [http://perma.cc/
JJ8X-LCK7] (describing Joan Rivers’s revocable trust); Danielle Mayoras & Andy Mayoras,
What’s Next for Robin Williams’ Family and Estate?, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/trialandheirs/2014/08/12/whats-next-for-robin-williams-family-and-
estate/ [http://perma.cc/8CU6-FBZL] (describing Robin Williams’s use of trusts in his estate
planning); David Shulman, Michael Jackson’s Will Filed with Court, S. FLA. EST. PLAN. L.
BLOG (July 1, 2009), http://www.sofloridaestateplanning.com/2009/07/articles/estate-tax/
michael-jacksons-will-filed-with-court/ [http://perma.cc/RW74-QMYT] (describing Michael
Jackson’s pour-over will and trust). 
86. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 468 (describing how settlors avoid ongoing
accounting requirements and take advantage of other states’ more favorable laws through
revocable trust planning).
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tive inconvenience of a formal, court-supervised guardianship or
conservatorship proceeding.87 Following the settlor’s death, the ad-
vantages of trust planning over outright gifts are equally mean-
ingful. Trusts can provide beneficiaries with protection from most
creditors, including tort victims and even ex-spouses.88 Trusts also
impose a measure of control over beneficiaries’ access to funds over
time; a settlor who is concerned that the objects of her bounty might
not use or invest funds wisely can vest decision making with a
trusted individual or institution responsible for managing and dis-
tributing the property.89 
B. The Inter Vivos Trust in Modern Estate Planning: Challenges
Although donative trusts can provide significant advantages over
outright bequests, they also pose weighty design and administrative
challenges that stem from the fact that trusts separate beneficial
from legal ownership and usually involve administration of property
over an extended period of time.90 As I have explained in a previous
article:
no property owner can predict perfectly how the years will affect
her beneficiaries and her possessions. Beneficiaries’ needs will
change, for example, as the beneficiaries marry or divorce, start
or lose a business, or develop or overcome an illness or addiction.
Investments too will change, for example, by under or over-
performing, reacting to world events, or re-forming into a
different shape altogether. How the settlor would want her gift
87. Id. at 465.
88. Id. at 691-703.
89. See Langbein, supra note 11, at 637-43 (describing management aspects of modern
donative trusts). 
90. See, e.g., SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 80, § 1.1; Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freed-
man, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 621, 623 (2004); Lee-ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Costs
Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2587-88, 2614 (2011). One commentator aptly
characterized private donative trusts as gifts “projected on the plane of time, and so subjected
to a management regime.” Bernard Rudden, Book Review, 44 MOD. L. REV. 610, 610 (1981);
see also Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 215,
217 (2011) (quoting Rudden, supra); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust
as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1997) (same).
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to accommodate these endless permutations is difficult to antici-
pate and therefore to counsel, which is a particular problem in
a legal realm where the typical court resolving such a dispute
would prioritize the settlor’s intention over all else.91 
In my previous work, I have noted that “[t]here are two possible
approaches to this planning dilemma, and most trust arrangements
combine gradations of each.”92 The first approach is “to draft a trust
agreement that provides the trustee with clear distribution stan-
dards, describes the settlor’s primary concerns, and dictates re-
sponses to various contingencies that are likely to arise.”93 With this
approach, however, the parties must be willing to bear the adminis-
trative costs of drafting for contingencies.94 Moreover, the directives
work well only if the settlor’s predictions are accurate.95 Recognizing
that all the planning in the world still cannot control the future, the
second approach to dealing with the imperfect foresight that accom-
panies a gift over time is to repose significant discretion in a
91.  Deborah S. Gordon, Trusting Trust, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 497, 503-04 (2014); see supra
notes 20, 32 and accompanying text; see also Kelly, supra note 32, at 1160; Sitkoff, supra note
90, at 638 (“[T]he law regularly subordinates the interests of the beneficiaries as residual
claimants to the dead-hand interests of the settlor, an outgrowth of the frequently pater-
nalistic function of the donative trust.”). But see Gallanis, supra note 90, at 216 (“American
trust law, after decades of favoring the settlor, is moving in a new direction, with a
reassertion of the interests and rights of the beneficiaries.”). 
92. Gordon, supra note 91, at 504; see also Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary
Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 89 (2005) (“Parties that cannot
anticipate all potential agency cost problems rely on fiduciary duties as a substitute for
express contract provisions.”).
93. Gordon, supra note 91, at 504; see also Kristen E. Caverly, Help Clients Grant the
Right Level of Trustee Discretion, 39 EST. PLAN. 18, 19-28 (2012) (providing samples of
language to guide trustee discretion); Benjamin H. Pruett, Tales from the Dark Side: Drafting
Issues from the Fiduciary’s Perspective, 35 ACTEC J. 331, 341-47 (2010) (same). 
94. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 813 (1983) (“[T]he
transaction costs involved in drawing up a detailed prior agreement covering all possible dis-
cretionary uses of power over the life of the relation would not only be enormous, but also
would probably exceed the benefits of the proposed relation. A more general document
(whether a contract, trust, or charter) setting forth only the main purposes of the relation and
the broad functions of the fiduciary would not impose such great transaction costs, but would
less adequately prevent specific abuses of power.”); Kelly, supra note 32, at 1158-61
(describing costs and contingencies); Melanie Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary
Standards and Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2719 (2006) (“Settlors and trustees
cannot draft agreements that accurately anticipate and resolve all future conflicts.”). 
95. See Seth W. Krasilovsky, Exercising Discretion in Administering Discretionary Trusts,
36 EST. PLAN. 32, 32 (2009).
478 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:455
trustee.96 In other words, the trust agreement’s distributive and
investment directives are drafted to allow the trustee flexibility to
deal with whatever inevitable uncertainties time may engender.97 
As inadequate as the first approach may seem because of the
costs associated with trying to anticipate what will happen in the
future and the gaps and chinks that are likely to appear with the
passage of time,98 the second approach is equally troublesome. The
second approach offers little reassurance to the settlor that her vi-
sion will be followed, scant guidance to the trustee on how best to
accommodate the different interests of the beneficiaries and the
settlor, and few guideposts to the beneficiaries on whether the
trustee is acting in accordance with the trust that the settlor has
reposed in her. In fact, what this approach offers is a relationship
situated in the context of standards for fiduciary conduct general-
ly.99 The greater the discretion, the more important fiduciary duties
are to ensuring that the trust functions properly, that the trustee
does not take advantage of her position, and that she devotes
96. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1425, 1425 (1961); see also Krasilovsky, supra note 95, at 34-35 (providing examples of
“absolute discretion” language).
97. Halbach, supra note 96, at 1426; see also Peter B. Tiernan, A Trustee’s Duties and
Responsibilities Under Discretionary Invasion Provisions, 79 FLA. B.J. 50, 50 (2005) (describ-
ing standards of discretion that appear in trusts). 
98. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 90, at 1048-49. Although default rules often help
clarify obligations where an instrument is silent, see, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in
Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2004)
[hereinafter Hirsch, Default Rules], whether these default rules are satisfactory has been
another subject of avid debate. See Cooper, supra note 11, at 1173 n.32; Hirsch, Default Rules,
supra, at 1039; Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 627-28 (2009); Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance,
Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 561 (1999) [hereinafter Leslie,
Family Promises]; see also Leslie, supra note 92, at 70 (arguing “that characterizing trustees’
fiduciary duties as pure ‘default rules’ ... blinds academics and courts to the need to develop
a coherent theory about the extent to which fiduciary duties can be modified.”). 
99. See Pruett, supra note 93, at 341 (“One of the most difficult tasks trustees face is how
to exercise broad (and generic) discretion in the administration of trusts, whether the trust
is fully discretionary, with no standards whatsoever, or discretionary subject to an ascer-
tainable standard.”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset
Partitioning, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 428, 430-31 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013) (“[S]pell[ing]
out with specificity what the trustee should do in all possible future circumstances [is] an
impossible task given transaction costs and the settlor’s lack of clairvoyance. Instead, trust
law provides the trustee with expansive default powers of administration, the trustee’s
exercise of which is subject to review ex post for compliance with the open-ended fiduciary
duties of loyalty and prudence.”). 
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sufficient attention to the trust.100 After all, the trustee wields sig-
nificant power based not only on her legal ownership and control of
the trust property, but also on her superior access to information
and, in many cases, the experience, expertise, and even status that
caused her to be appointed in the first place.101 
The duties imposed on a trustee are the most fundamental compo-
nent of a trust relationship because they help keep the fiduciary
accountable to the beneficiaries.102 For that reason, trust law has
traditionally placed limits on the entrustor’s ability to circumvent
or modify these duties, including the extent to which settlors may
exculpate their trustees for mistakes.103 Many jurisdictions have
allowed a settlor to include a provision in a trust instrument ex-
onerating a trustee for conduct taken in connection with her
appointment as trustee, but these jurisdictions have placed both
substantive and procedural limits on the enforcement of such
clauses.104 With respect to substance, a settlor may excuse a trustee
for negligent conduct or permit a trustee to engage in specified self-
interested transactions, but may not relieve a trustee from liability
for “breach[es] committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference
to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries”105
100. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 90, at 1048-56.
101. Frankel, supra note 94, at 804-10, 813-14; Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle,
37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 540-41 (1949); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 912 (characterizing trustee as “a
powerful prototype” of the fiduciary); Sitkoff, supra note 90, at 641 (“The de facto office of the
trustee serves as the organizing hub for the various relations that aggregate into the trust.”);
Edward D. Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles: Policy
and Ethical Considerations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 1361 (1994) (“Fiduciary relations
typically include those of trustee/beneficiary, guardian/ward, conservator/conservatee,
principal/agent, attorney/client, partner/partner, executor/legatee.”). 
102. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (requiring the trustee to
“administer the trust in good faith, in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust,
and in the interests of the beneficiaries”); see also Langbein, supra note 3, at 1123-25. 
103. See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 1027, 1067, 1067 n.232 (2012); Leslie, supra note 94, at 2746-52; Leslie, supra note
92, at 69-71.
104. Leslie, supra note 94, at 2748 (“[M]ost courts ... allow professional trustees to hide
behind exculpatory clauses only if there is evidence that the settlor had full information, the
trustee obtained advance approval, or the trustee is a non-professional.”).
105. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also McNeil v. McNeil, 798
A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002) (rejecting provision making decisions of trustees “not subject to
review by any court”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 (AM. LAW INST. 2012);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
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because doing so “would be to authorize the trustee to loot the
trust.”106 Under these circumstances, courts have rejected settlor
intent in favor of the concern that a trustee should act to serve the
beneficiaries’ interests and be accountable for her decisions.107 With
respect to process, a trustee bears the burden of demonstrating that
an exculpatory clause was fairly negotiated with the settlor and
therefore reflects her intent, acquiescence, and understanding.108
The rationale for enforcing exculpatory clauses, subject to these
safeguards, is very much akin to the rationale supporting forfeiture
clauses: the property belongs to the settlor and is freely devisable
pursuant to her direction and conditions.109 
C. How Trusts’ Structures and Uses Have Affected Trust
Forfeiture Clauses
The most common challenges to trusts do not mirror the most
common challenges to wills. There certainly are cases in which trust
beneficiaries challenge the validity of a trust agreement based on
the settlor’s lack of capacity or a third party’s undue influence.110 In
fact, a trust beneficiary theoretically has “a better chance of pre-
vailing in a trust contest for lack of capacity as compared to a will
contestant” because in many jurisdictions the capacity required to
106. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); Langbein, supra note 12, at 1106;
see also Thomas P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1621 (2007)
(“The settlor of an irrevocable trust is given significant room to control the trustee’s actions
but cannot dispense with the core responsibility of the trustee to administer the trust in the
interests of the beneficiaries.”).
107. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 1124.
108. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 222(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2012); Horton, supra note 10, at 1728; Langbein, supra note
3, at 1124-25. For a discussion of how exculpatory clauses and forfeiture clauses serve slightly
different purposes, see infra note 247.
109. Horton, supra note 10, at 1706-07, 1732; see Leslie, supra note 92, at 101.
110. See, e.g., Cresto v. Cresto, 310 P.3d 1079, 1079 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (unpublished table
decision), review granted, (June 20, 2014) (per curiam) (“The plaintiffs challenged the 2008
will and trust arguing the instruments were invalid based on undue influence.”); In re Miller
Osborne Perry Tr., 831 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (asking court to determine
whether beneficiary had probable cause to challenge trust amendments based on undue
influence); Nickles v. Spisak, No. 2013-P-0094, 2014 WL 2882429, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June
23, 2014) (claiming trust amendments were executed under undue influence); Wilson v.
Dallas, 743 S.E.2d 746, 760-62 (S.C. 2013) (challenging undue influence in execution of will
and irrevocable trust).
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execute a trust is greater than the minimal capacity required to
execute a will.111 A forfeiture clause that discourages challenges to
a trust agreement’s validity deserves to be treated identically to a
will forfeiture clause; the beneficiary who is considering whether to
file a contest in the face of this type of clause knows that a “worth-
less” challenge, however defined,112 will risk the inheritance the
beneficiary otherwise receives. Like a litigant who is considering
whether to settle a lawsuit,113 the beneficiary can assess her options
in light of a generally fixed factual context and can complain, or for-
bear from complaining, depending on how she values her risks and
rewards. Allowing a settlor to include this traditional but narrow
type of forfeiture clause to deter overly litigious beneficiaries is a
fair way to balance the settlor’s right to control her legacy against
the inheritance system’s responsibility to enforce only legitimate
testamentary documents. 
With the rise in the use of living trusts as property management
devices, it has become more difficult as a practical matter to chal-
lenge trust agreement validity.114 As noted above, an important
advantage to inter vivos trusts is that they can be funded during life
and used to administer, invest, and distribute assets during and
even after a settlor loses capacity.115 Although the trust is revocable,
the settlor is the only person who can mount any challenges to it;
the remaindermen must wait until the settlor’s death before their
interests vest and they have standing to bring a contest.116 It is far
more difficult to invalidate a trust agreement, or even one of its
provisions, based on a claim that the settlor was unaware or not in
control of what she was doing when she signed the agreement, or
that she revoked it or did not execute it with the proper formalities,
111. Beyer et al., supra note 5, at 229; see also Engelhardt, supra note 10, at 537. But see,
e.g., Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 200 (Mo. 2014) (en banc), reh’g denied, (Mo. Sept. 30, 2014)
(“The capacity required to make or amend a revocable trust is the same as that required to
make a will—‘testamentary capacity.’”) (citations omitted).
112. See supra Part I.B. 
113. Begleiter, supra note 5, at 645 n.108, 671. 
114. Of course, if the trust is simply an empty basket that receives property from the pour-
over will, the challenge would most likely be to that will’s validity. 
115. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 465-68.
116. See, e.g., In re Tr. No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 485-89 (Iowa 2013); In re
Malasky, 736 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152-53 (App. Div. 2002); Moon v. Lesikar, 230 S.W.3d 800, 806
(Tex. App. 2007); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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if the trust was funded and functioning during the settlor’s life and
she lived with its terms and received notice of its operations for
some period of time.117 
Many lawsuits involving trusts recognize the trust agreement’s
validity but claim that a trustee breached one or more fiduciary
duties under that agreement, such as investing improperly,118 favor-
ing one beneficiary over another,119 failing to share information or
file accounts,120 making ill-advised or unauthorized allocations or
distributions,121 or acting beyond the powers set forth in the trust
instrument or under the law.122 Because the most effective forfeiture
clauses are tailored to the type of challenge that a property owner
anticipates,123 a settlor who seeks to deter litigation and incentivize
harmony among her beneficiaries understandably would want to
direct her forfeiture clause toward the most common types of con-
tests. Not surprisingly, then, cautious and crafty draftspersons,
seeking to dissuade beneficiaries from overlitigating, have started
to include trust forfeiture clauses that specifically protect decision
making by the settlors’ hand-picked fiduciaries.124 
Consider, for example, a trust forfeiture clause that appeared in
a 2013 Georgia case and provided that if any of the settlor’s four
117. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 467 (“[I]f a trust continues as an ongoing
operation for years before the settlor dies, generating monthly or yearly statements and in-
volving various property transfers by a third-party trustee, a court is likely to be reluctant to
set the trust aside.”).
118. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 13, § 701; Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Reducing Estate
and Trust Litigation Through Disclosure, In Terrorem Clauses, Mediation and Arbitration,
36 ACTEC L.J. 547, 571 (2010); see, e.g., In re Berget, No. A13-2295, 2014 WL 6863043, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2014).
119. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 13, § 541; see, e.g., In re Knichel, 347 S.W.3d 127, 129
(Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
120. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 963, 966; see, e.g., In re Thomas H. Gentry Revoc-
able Tr., No. 29727, 2013 WL 376083, at *2 (Haw. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2013).
121. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 13, § 541; see, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Bank of N.Y., 676 F.
Supp. 2d 229, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
122. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 13, § 541; see, e.g., In re Fallgren Family Tr. ex rel.
Fallgren, No. A13-2388, 2014 WL 7011156, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2014).
123. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 48 (explaining that courts historically did not allow generally
worded forfeiture clauses to provide trustees with “blanket protection for their actions”). 
124. See, e.g., In re Shaheen Tr., 341 P.3d 1169, 1170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015); Peterson v.
Peck, 430 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013); Bradley v. Gilbert, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680, 681-
83 (Ct. App. 2009); Callaway v. Willard, 739 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Hamel v.
Hamel, 299 P.3d 278, 289 (Kan. 2013); Commonwealth Bank & Tr. Co. v. Young, 361 S.W.3d
344, 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012); Di Portanova v. Monroe, 402 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Tex. App. 2012).
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children filed “a legal or equitable challenge to the management
decisions made or proposed by [the] trustee during the administra-
tion of [the] Trust, or pertaining to the management of the Trust
Estate, or in regards to the final distribution of the Trust Estate”
and did not succeed, the challenger forfeited all rights created by the
trust.125 Another example appears in a 2013 Arkansas case, “can-
cel[ling]” the share of any descendant of the settlor who instituted
“any action to challenge the provisions of the trusts established by
this document, or to attack the validity of such trusts, or to remove
[the surviving spouse] as Trustee, or question her actions as Trust-
ee.”126 A 2013 Kansas case describes a clause disinheriting any
beneficiary who, among other things, “object[ed] in any manner to
any action taken or proposed to be taken in good faith by the Trust-
ee under said trust or any amendment to it.”127 Some settlors rein-
force their motives by including express statements of their reasons
for conditioning receipt of property on a beneficiary’s acquiescence
to the trustee’s judgment and conduct. For example, one clause,
discussed in a 2013 California case, described the trust’s co-creators’
aversion to “time consuming and costly litigation concerning the
function of [the] Trust and disbursement of the assets,” especially
since they had “taken great care to designate, through the provi-
sions of [the] Trust, how they want[ed] the Trust Estate distrib-
uted.”128 
125. Callaway, 739 S.E.2d at 535. 
126. Peterson, 430 S.W.3d at 802.
127. Hamel, 299 P.3d at 289; see also Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Mo. Ct. App.
2004) (enforcing a clause that provided: “If any beneficiary, excluding trustee, makes any
allegation or causes litigation either prior to or after his death they will automatically forfeit
their designated amount.”). Experienced and thoughtful estate planners will consider their
clients’ specific family circumstances before inserting forfeiture clauses into wills and trusts
rather than including these clauses as boilerplate in every client’s documents. See T. Jack
Challis, Not So Fast: Drafting, Planning, and Litigating No Contest Clauses, SS007 ALI-ABA
497, 502-05 (Sept. 13-14, 2010). In a 2010 presentation and paper that was part of the
American Law Institute’s Sophisticated Estate Planning Techniques series, T. Jack Challis
advised against including “standard” clauses in testamentary documents and recommended
consulting state law and conferring with clients regarding the clauses’ intended scope and
impact. Id. at 505.
128. Donkin v. Donkin, 314 P.3d 780, 784 (Cal. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 82 (2014); see
also Wilson v. Dallas, 743 S.E.2d 746, 761 (S.C. 2013) (property owner “painstakingly devel-
oped his estate plan over the course of several years” and a “strong indicator of [his] intent
is his inclusion of no-contest clauses in both his will and trust”). 
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Although these clauses may vary linguistically, their purpose is
the same: to cut down on the most likely challenges, presumably
because such challenges can significantly reduce a trust’s corpus,
through payment of litigation expenses and fees, and can undermine
a settlor’s design for her property. The next Part describes judicial
and legislative responses to these increasingly broad forfeiture
clauses. 
III. TRUSTS AND FORFEITURE CLAUSES
A significant number of appellate courts recently have had to
decide whether to disinherit a trust beneficiary who questioned a
trustee’s decision making when the trust in question contained an
expansive forfeiture clause that directed such a result.129 Some ju-
risdictions have refused to enforce forfeiture clauses that are broad
enough to apply to actions against fiduciaries, notwithstanding clear
settlor intent to the contrary, citing “public policy.”130 Several other
jurisdictions have deprived litigious beneficiaries of their rights to
multi-million dollar trusts, finding that the beneficiaries forfeited
those rights by challenging their trustees’ decision making.131 Still
other courts have skirted the issue, not yet clarified their approach
to it, or allowed it to become intertwined with other doctrines
governing fiduciary conduct.132 The Uniform Trust Code has no
provision addressing trust forfeiture clauses, and the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts has a provision that remains in draft form.133 In
other words, this topic is ripe for scrutiny. The balance of this Part
129. See In re Shaheen Tr., 341 P.3d at 1170; Peterson, 430 S.W.3d at 798; Callaway, 739
S.E.2d at 534-35; Hamel, 299 P.3d at 281; Young, 361 S.W.3d at 353; Rouner v. Wise, 446
S.W.3d 242, 260 (Mo. 2014); In re Dugan Revocable Living Tr., No. 60263, 2014 WL 549697,
at *1 (Nev. Feb. 10, 2014); Frakes v. Nay, 295 P.3d 94, 100 (Or. Ct. App. 2013); Di Portanova,
402 S.W.3d at 717; see also Donkin, 314 P.3d at 785 (narrow forfeiture clause alleged to apply
to broad range of conduct); In re Estate of Stan, 839 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013)
(same); Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741, 746 (N.H. 2013) (same).
130. See infra Part III.A.
131. See infra Part III.B. 
132. See Stewart v. Ciccaglione, No. CV074008040S, 2014 WL 1647035, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Mar. 26, 2014) (opening issue of a forfeiture clause for the limited purpose of offering
evidence); Young, 361 S.W.3d at 351 (holding that the merits of the claim that children
violated a no-contest provision were not before the court); see also infra notes 217-18 and
accompanying text.
133. See infra Part III.C.
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describes the various approaches courts have taken, none of which
seem particularly aware of countervailing views.
A. Public Policy and Fiduciary Duties: The California Approach
Several jurisdictions have refused to apply trust forfeiture clauses
to beneficiaries who contested issues involving fiduciary conduct,
regardless of how broadly and clearly those clauses were worded.134
The courts that have taken this approach cite public policy as the
basis for not enforcing clauses that “immunize fiduciaries from
[state] law governing the actions of such fiduciaries.”135 Most have
extracted this idea from precedent involving traditional will forfei-
ture clauses and have not specifically considered how, if at all, trusts
differ.136 
California courts have had a particularly robust opportunity to
consider forfeiture clauses that apply to fiduciary conduct,137 and for
that reason Bradley v. Gilbert provides both a thorough discussion
of the public policy approach and a compelling example of why a
134. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-1014 (2014) (enforcement of no-contest, in terrorem or
forfeiture provisions); Donkin, 314 P.3d at 796-97 (finding argument that “successor trustees
engaged in misconduct when they failed to carry out the terms of the Family Trust instru-
ment, as interpreted by the beneficiaries” to “fall within public policy exceptions for challenges
to fiduciary misconduct and, therefore, as a matter of law, ... do not violate the no contest
clauses”); Callaway, 739 S.E.2d at 535-38; Di Portanova, 402 S.W.3d at 717-19; see also In re
Estate of Stralem, 695 N.Y.S.2d 274, 278 (Sur. Ct. 1999); Browder, Re-Examined, supra note
10, at 324 (“Where ... the condition seems broad enough to cover the conduct in question, the
only issue should be whether public policy prevents its enforcement.”).
135. Callaway, 739 S.E.2d at 539.
136. See, e.g., id. (citing Sinclair v. Sinclair, 670 S.E.2d 59, 60-61 (Ga. 2008) and Snook v.
Sessoms, 350 S.E.2d 237, 238 (Ga. 1986)); Di Portanova, 402 S.W.3d at 717-18 (citing
McLendon v. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. App. 1993) and Estate of Newbill, 781
S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex. App. 1989)).
137. See Donkin, 314 P.3d at 797 n.15 (“[T]he law in California regarding no contest clauses
has evolved over the course of many years, with an incremental specification by common law
and statutory amendment of numerous public policy exceptions to the enforcement of no
contest clauses” including challenges to fiduciary conduct); see also, e.g., Rumph v. Mayo, No.
B248765, 2014 WL 3362677, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. July 10, 2014), reh’g denied, (Aug. 5, 2014)
(refusing to disinherit beneficiaries because challenge to trustees’ conduct under 1993 trust
was not “frivolous”); Fazzi v. Klein, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224, 232 (Ct. App. 2010) (“[A] trustee
cannot ‘hide behind a no contest clause’ and commit breaches of fiduciary duty with impu-
nity.”); Hearst v. Ganzi, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 485-86 (Ct. App. 2006) (beneficiaries’ petition
“to hold the Trustees personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty ... conflicts with the terms
of the instrument and therefore would amount to a contest” in violation of no-contest clause). 
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settlor would choose to include a clause that conditions a benefi-
ciary’s continuing receipt of trust funds on her acquiescence to a
trustee’s decision making.138 Bradley arose out of a distressing but
not unfamiliar series of events. Parents, who were married for more
than fifty years, created an estate plan in 1992 essentially leaving
everything to the survivor and then to the couple’s two adult child-
ren.139 They achieved this result by executing a joint trust agree-
ment, which, on the first death, divided the couple’s property among
three subtrusts: a marital trust, a family trust, and a survivor’s
trust.140 Although the trust agreement did not give the surviving
spouse power to change the beneficial interests in the marital or
family trusts, it did permit the survivor, as trustee, to defer alloca-
ting assets among the subtrusts and to amend the survivor’s
trust.141 The original trust instrument creating this plan contained
a simple and typical forfeiture clause disinheriting anyone who “con-
test[ed] or attack[ed] [the] instrument or any of its provisions.”142
The surviving spouse was named as trustee of all three subtrusts,
and the couple’s son, Chris, was named successor trustee.143 The
total net worth of the couple at the time that they executed their
joint estate plan was approximately $7.84 million.144 Two years after
signing those documents, the mother died.145 Soon thereafter, the
father, then in his seventies, “became romantically involved with
one Flora Ibarra, a married woman, who became his live-in compan-
ion and caregiver.”146
138. See 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680 (Ct. App. 2009). Although Donkin is a more current descrip-
tion of California’s approach to forfeiture clauses, the case primarily discusses procedural
issues revolving around amendment of the California statute, so it is less helpful on the sub-
stantive issue of fiduciary conduct. See infra note 155. 
139. Bradley, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 681. 
140. Id.
141. Id. at 681-82. 
142. Id. at 682. The original clause provided, in full, as follows: “Non Contest-Contestant
disinherited: If any beneficiary in any manner, directly or indirectly, contests or attacks this
instrument or any of its provisions, any share or interest in the trust given to that contesting
beneficiary under this instrument is revoked and shall be disposed of in the same manner
provided herein as if that contesting beneficiary had predeceased the Settlor.” Id. (emphasis
added).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 684.
145. Id. at 682.
146. Id. 
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Increasingly set apart from their father over the ensuing decade,
the children learned of his death only upon receipt of a probate
petition.147 At that time, the children also learned that the value of
the marital and family trusts, which became irrevocable on their
mother’s death and for which Chris was to succeed his father as
trustee, had dropped to $177,000.148 Not surprisingly, the children
began to question their father’s conduct as fiduciary vis-à-vis their
mother’s estate and the trusts that the parents created together.149
From 1995, when the father’s relationship with Ibarra began, until
2006, when the father died, he amended the “survivor’s trust” nine
times, reducing shares for his children, increasing shares for Ibarra
and her family, and naming his office assistant (rather than his son)
as successor trustee.150 The father also significantly rewrote—and
expanded—the forfeiture clause in the survivor’s trust to discourage
any challenges to his new estate plan.151 The revised forfeiture
clause applied not only to anyone who contested the validity of the
testamentary documents but also to anyone who challenged appoint-
ment of and actions by fiduciaries, property designations and
allocations among the trust and other assets owned by the decedent
at death, and transactions affecting Ibarra or her family.152 Nearly
two pages in length, the forfeiture clause provided that any benefici-
aries who engaged in prohibited behaviors listed in thirteen sep-
arate sections would be “specifically disinherit[ed]” and all interests
otherwise given to that person, his spouse, and his issue “forfeited”
as if the person were predeceased.153 Specific triggers for depriving
a beneficiary of rights under the trust included, among other things:
(1) Contesting the trust agreement or will, or “in any manner”
seeking “to impair or invalidate” any of their respective provi-
sions; 
(2) Claiming “entitlement to any asset” owned by the decedent
or his trust “whether or not such claim is successful”; 
147. Id. at 684.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 682. 
151. Id.
152. Id. at 682-84. 
153. Id. at 683. 
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(3) Unsuccessfully challenging appointment of any fiduciary
or unsuccessfully seeking that fiduciary’s removal; and
(4) Objecting “in any manner to any action taken or proposed
to be taken in good faith” by any fiduciary (“including, without
limitation, the good faith exercise or non-exercise of any
discretion granted” to that fiduciary) regardless of how or when
the action was taken and “whether or not such claim is success-
ful.”154
Regardless of how an observer feels about the father changing his
estate plan and allocating particular assets to and among the
various subtrusts, either as trustee or as co-settlor, it is easy to see
why the father included such an extensive forfeiture clause: it pro-
vided added insurance that his intent would be effectuated because
beneficiaries who challenged his decision making would potentially
forfeit their inheritances. In other words, anticipating animosity
between his children and Ibarra, his companion, he seemed deter-
mined to make his children think carefully before contesting his
plan and any decision making associated with it. The father’s intent
is not hard to discern. 
At the time of the father’s death, California had in place a sum-
mary review procedure for determining whether an action would
violate a forfeiture clause,155 and the son therefore sought a ruling
154. Id. at 682-84.
155. Forfeiture clauses in California are recognized and governed by statute, the most
recent version of which was enacted in 2010 in an effort to simplify what had become an
overly complex and heavily litigated piece of legislation. See Donkin v. Donkin, 314 P.3d 780,
788-90 (Cal. 2013). From 1989, when study of these clauses and their common law enforce-
ment began, until 2010, the statutory scheme included a list of actions that, for public policy
reasons, could be brought without triggering forfeiture. Id. at 787-88. For example, prior to
2010, the California probate code provided that “‘notwithstanding anything to the contrary’”
in a testamentary instrument, “pleadings that ‘challeng[e] the exercise of a fiduciary power
... do not violate a no contest clause as a matter of public policy.’” Id. at 796-97 (quoting CAL.
PROB. CODE § 21305(b)(6) (West 2005)). A new study of the clauses occurred in 2005, and the
Commission issued a report in 2008, recognizing that there were still many “important public
policy” reasons to enforce the forfeiture provisions, either in wills or trusts, including “respec-
ting a transferor’s ability to control the use and disposition of his or her own property and to
avoid the cost, delay, public exposure, and additional discord between beneficiaries involved
in litigation over the transferor’s estate plan.” Id. at 788. Because California is a community
property state, the Commission also recognized that “proper disposition of a transferor’s
property [may be] complicated by difficult property characterization issues,” (separate vs.
community) so that “a no contest clause may also appropriately operate as a ‘forced election’
in order to avoid ownership disputes.” Id. The legislature decided to amend the statute and
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that a petition, by him as trustee, to marshal assets of the marital
and family trusts would not violate the expansive forfeiture clause
in the survivor trust.156 The son first argued that a statutory excep-
tion to forfeiture clauses applied because he filed the suit as a
trustee, rather than as a beneficiary, and was seeking to determine
whether actions taken by his father, the previous trustee, were in
contravention of any fiduciary duties.157 In response, the successor
trustee of the survivor trust argued that the settlor amended that
trust to include the “draconian” forfeiture clause for the reason of
prohibiting the settlor’s children or anyone else from contesting
actions taken by him as trustee, which was precisely what the son
was doing.158 Regardless of whether the son brought his claims as
trustee or beneficiary, the trustee argued, the son’s “petition would
impermissibly thwart [the decedent’s] intended estate plan,” and
therefore the petition should invoke the forfeiture clause.159 In other
words, the broad trust forfeiture clause’s legality was directly at
issue.
Refusing to allow settlor intent to trump fiduciary accountability,
both the trial and reviewing courts agreed that a petition to marshal
assets, and any other challenge to fiduciary conduct, would not trig-
ger a forfeiture clause even if the beneficiary (and not the trustee)
filed the petition.160 “Public policy,” the appellate court explained,
allows a beneficiary “to question the actions of a faithless fiduciary
without being subject to the restrictions of such a clause” because
detecting and deterring “errant fiduciaries” who are “engaged in
misconduct” is an important purpose of a court’s oversight and can-
not be overwritten by a property owner.161 
remove what were known as “safe harbor proceedings,” which essentially added a second layer
of litigation. Id. at 790. The simplified probate code provides that only certain defined
categories of actions will trigger forfeiture: “direct contests,” defined as challenges to the
instrument or execution thereof; creditors’ claims, but only if they are specifically mentioned
in the no-contest clause; and claims about characterization of property, but only if they are
mentioned in the no-contest clause. Id.
156. Bradley, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 684.
157. Id. at 685. 
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 686, 689.
161. Id. at 688. 
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This broad public policy rejection of trust forfeiture clauses is not
really new, having appeared in an old New York case that consider-
ed the legality of a particularly “drastic” clause162 conditioning trust
beneficiaries’ gifts on receipt of a written document “acquiesce[ing]
in the administration of said trusts” and “approv[ing], ratify[ing]
and confirm[ing] all acts and things done by the respective Trustees
thereunder ... with respect to the administration of the trust proper-
ties.”163 The settlor, who had created and funded two inter vivos
trusts of $10 million apiece, explained in the trust instruments that
he was including this condition because he had “been kept informed
of such administration, and [was] completely satisfied therewith”
and “desire[d] ... all which has been done and all the acts which
have been taken by the Trustees.”164 The Westchester County Surro-
gate refused to enforce the clause, reasoning in a quite long and
thoughtful opinion that the “attempted provision runs counter to the
very fundamental principles of trust law” including the state’s “real
interest in having its courts of equity supervise trust administra-
tion.”165 Courts in Georgia and Texas also have refused to enforce
162. Leavitt, supra note 6, at 56.
163. See In re Andrus’ Will, 281 N.Y.S. 831, 840 (Sur. Ct. 1935).
164. Id. at 839-40. But see In re Tumminello v. Bolten, 873 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (App. Div.
2009) (finding that trust beneficiary lacked standing to compel his sister, trustee of trust
established by their father, to account because beneficiary had previously sought a ruling that
the trust was “null and void” and, in so doing, triggered forfeiture clause, which prohibited
any beneficiary from contesting “the Trust or any of its provisions in any manner, ‘directly or
indirectly’”).
165. Andrus, 281 N.Y.S. at 850. The continued viability of the eighty-year-old Andrus case
is not entirely clear, however, given New York’s current approach to fiduciary oversight,
which applies different standards to wills and trusts. Although New York law permits testa-
mentary forfeiture clauses, N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.5 (McKinney 2014), it
prohibits testamentary exculpatory clauses. Id. § 11-1.73(a)(1). At least one New York sur-
rogate’s court has struck down a forfeiture clause that was triggered by challenges to fiduciary
decision making by relying on the legislative history of the exculpatory clause statute and
reasoning that a clause disinheriting any trust beneficiary who refused to “execute releases
to the trustees as a precondition to sharing” attempted a “not so clever[ ]” end-run around
statutory prohibition on exculpatory clauses. In re Estate of Stralem, 695 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-
77 (Sur. Ct. 1999). The Stralem court reasoned that “forcing the beneficiaries to accept the
accounting as presented with no opportunity to challenge it on grounds of failure to exercise
reasonable prudence, care and diligence” was equivalent to exculpating the fiduciaries for
negligent conduct and therefore void as against public policy. Id. at 278; cf. In re Estate of
Prevratil, 990 N.Y.S.2d 697, 705-06 (App. Div. 2014) (“[E]ven if decedent’s intent were to
prohibit a beneficiary from questioning the conduct of [the executor], such a broad no contest
clause would be void as against public policy.”). The ban on exculpating fiduciaries, however,
has not been extended to trusts. Ilene S. Cooper & Robert M. Harper, Incomplete Protection:
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provisions that penalize beneficiaries for questioning trustee con-
duct, regardless of the settlors’ explicitly stated desires to allow
their trustees to act without impediment.166 
In 2013, Tennessee, seeking to become more competitive in its
trust business, enacted comprehensive trust legislation that includ-
ed a statute expressly addressing broad trust forfeiture clauses.167
The statute defines a forfeiture clause to include a provision that
“would reduce or eliminate the interest of any beneficiary of such
trust who, directly or indirectly, initiates or otherwise pursues ...
[a]ny action to challenge the acts of the trustee or other fiduciary of
the trust in the performance of the trustee’s or other fiduciary’s
duties.”168 Although the statute directs courts to “enforce the set-
tlor’s intent as reflected in a no-contest provision to the greatest
extent possible,”169 the statute excludes challenges to fiduciary con-
duct from the list of contests that would trigger forfeiture.170 Those
contests are limited to allegations of fraud, lack of capacity, mistake,
and other challenges to document validity.171 In other words, like
California, Tennessee prohibits forfeiture clauses that discourage
beneficiaries from suing their trustees for trust-related decision
making.172 Interestingly, the state legislature has presumably
decided that Tennessee will gain prominence as a trust-friendly
Exoneration Clauses in New York Trusts and Powers of Attorney, 28 TOURO L. REV. 379, 383
(2012) (recognizing that “courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to the applicability
of EPTL section 11-1.7 to inter vivos trust instruments and the enforceability of the excul-
patory provisions contained in them,” and recommending an extension of the statute to
trusts); see also In re Jastrzebski, 948 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (App. Div. 2012) (same); In re
Mankin, 930 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80 (App. Div. 2011) (“While the essential ingredient of a trust is the
accountability of the trustee, exculpatory provisions ... are valid in inter vivos trusts so long
as there is some accountability, at least to the settlor.”); Bauer v. Bauernschmidt, 589
N.Y.S.2d 582, 583 (App. Div. 1992) (same); In re Will of Mednick, 587 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (Sur.
Ct. 1992) (“[L]imitations on the powers and immunities of testamentary trustees under EPTL
11-1.7 do not apply to inter vivos trustees.”). It is therefore not entirely clear how the juris-
diction would view an expansive forfeiture clause in an inter vivos trust. 
166. Callaway v. Willard, 739 S.E.2d 533, 536-39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Di Portanova v.
Monroe, 402 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Tex. App. 2012). 
167. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-1014 (West 2014) (effective July 1, 2013). 
168. Id. § 35-15-1014(a)(3).
169. Id. § 35-15-1014(d).
170. Id. § 35-15-1014(b), (c)(1).
171. Id. § 35-15-1014(b)(1)-(8).
172. Id. § 35-15-1014(c)(1) (clauses not enforceable in actions “brought solely to challenge
the acts of the trustee ... to the extent [the trustee] has committed a breach of fiduciary duties
or breach of trust”).
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state, even though its legislation does not honor settlor intent as
expressed in expansive trust forfeiture clauses. 
These jurisdictions that reject trust forfeiture clauses on public
policy grounds justify their approach by recognizing that beneficia-
ries must be able to police their fiduciaries’ conduct or a trust itself
would be meaningless. Although this position seems intuitively cor-
rect, its blanket prohibition on trust forfeiture clauses essentially
ignores the role of donative intent. Especially if the interpersonal
relationships involved in the particular trust’s administration are
likely to be contentious, a rule that incentivizes a beneficiary to re-
frain from filing frivolous complaints against her trustees might
better balance all parties’ interests. Presumably for this reason,
several jurisdictions have enforced expansive trust forfeiture clauses
to disinherit beneficiaries who challenged their trustees’ decision
making. The next Section describes this recent spate of cases.
B. Settlor Intent and Trustee Expertise: Enforcing Forfeiture
Clauses
In contrast to the public policy approach, and in the name of
settlor intent, trustee expertise, and plain language, several juris-
dictions have either divested litigious beneficiaries of the right to
inherit trust property or acknowledged that the law may allow for
such disinheritance.173 All of the “contests” brought by the beneficia-
ries in these cases, regardless of how they were styled, involved
claims that were directed toward trustee decision making at some
point after the trusts had been funded and during the course of the
trusts’ administrations. This rapidly evolving trend is noteworthy
because, by assuming that forfeiture clauses in trusts are identical
to forfeiture clauses in wills and therefore subject to the same anal-
ysis, these courts have ignored the differences between the donative
vehicles—especially that trust law’s essence is fiduciary accountabil-
ity.
173. See In re Shaheen Tr., 341 P.3d 1169, 1171-72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015); Peterson v. Peck,
430 S.W.3d 797, 802-03 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013); Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741, 746 (N.H.
2013); see also Hamel v. Hamel, 299 P.3d 278, 288-89 (Kan. 2013) (acknowledging validity of
such clauses but refusing to apply in specific factual context); In re Dugan Revocable Living
Tr., No. 60263, 2014 WL 549697, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 10, 2014) (same).
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The most recent appellate body to adopt this approach is the
Arizona Court of Appeals, which, on January 16, 2015, decided to di-
vest two trust beneficiaries of their interests in a 1994 trust because
those beneficiaries included at least one meritless claim against the
trustee in a petition that contained multiple breach of trust
claims.174 The case, In re Shaheen Trust, involved a forfeiture clause
that revoked any gift to any beneficiary who “directly or indirectly,
contest[ed] or attack[ed] the validity of either Settlor’s Will, [the]
Trust or any disposition under either, by filing suit against ...
Trustee.”175 The trial court refused to enforce the clause not because
the clause contravened public policy, but rather because the court
found that the statute authorizing testamentary no-contest clauses
did not apply to trusts.176 The appellate court reversed, reasoning
that “although no-contest provisions in wills are governed by stat-
ute, and no-contest provisions in trusts are governed by the Restate-
ment, the standard for evaluating the enforceability of such clauses
does not differ between wills and trusts.”177 In other words, the
Shaheen court did not consider how trust forfeiture clauses might
differ from will forfeiture clauses and instead, following its will
precedent, held that the trust forfeiture clauses are triggered if a
“contest” lacks “probable cause.”178 
Explaining that the issue of whether plaintiffs had probable
cause to bring their petition was a question of law, the Shaheen ap-
pellate court proceeded to evaluate the basis for the plaintiffs’
claims in order to determine whether the plaintiffs’ “contest” would
trigger the forfeiture clause and result in disinheritance.179 This
question prompted a close analysis of the purpose for forfeiture
174. See Shaheen Tr., 341 P.3d at 1172-73.
175. Id. at 1170.
176. Id. at 1171.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1171-72. The Shaheen court went on to explain Arizona’s probable cause
standard as follows: 
Probable cause, in this context, is defined as ‘the existence, at the time of the
initiation of the proceeding, of evidence which would lead a reasonable person,
properly informed and advised, to conclude that there is a substantial likelihood
that the contest or attack will be successful.’ ... Subjective belief that the claims
are likely to succeed, while required, is not sufficient; the petitioner’s subjective
belief must be objectively reasonable.
Id. at 1172 (internal citations omitted).
179. Id. at 1172-73.
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clauses, because the Shaheen plaintiffs’ single petition had at least
nine separate claims,180 and the court was asked to decide, as an
issue of first impression, whether the forfeiture clause would apply
if only one of the claims lacked probable cause.181 In thinking about
the general public policy reasons that caution for and against en-
forcing these clauses, the Shaheen court focused on how the clauses
“preserv[e] the transferor’s donative intent, avoid[ ] waste of the
estate in litigation, and avoid[ ] use of a will contest to coerce a more
favorable settlement to a dissatisfied beneficiary” but prevent par-
ties from “prov[ing] a donative transfer is genuinely invalid.”182
Requiring that each separate challenge in a single petition be sup-
ported by probable cause, the court explained, would serve those
competing interests by making parties “carefully consider each chal-
lenge they might raise before filing a petition and instituting costly
litigation.”183 The “contest” that the court found to trigger forfeiture
of the beneficiaries’ interests did not question the trust instrument’s
validity, but instead alleged that the trustee was required to make
yearly, rather than monthly, distributions to herself, “despite the
absence of supportive language in the trust document, legal author-
ity, or other credible evidence.”184 As a result of including this claim
questioning the trustee’s decision making, and regardless of the
merit of the other claims in the petition, the beneficiaries forfeited
their interests in the trust.
Another receptive approach to a trust forfeiture clause that was
triggered by a challenge to trustee conduct appeared in the 2013
Arkansas case Peterson v. Peck, which involved a dispute between
a property owner’s widow and his daughter over ownership of a
unique and valuable work of art.185 Peck is particularly noteworthy
because it appears that forfeiture was triggered merely by the
beneficiary’s filing of the contest, regardless of whether the
180. Id. at 1173 n.3.
181. Id. at 1169, 1172.
182. Id. at 1172.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1172-73.
185. Peterson v. Peck, 430 S.W.3d 797, 798 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013). The artwork, a mobile
designed by Alexander Calder and called “Autumn Leaves,” had been acquired by the settlor’s
parents in the 1950s. Id.
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beneficiary had probable cause or ultimately prevailed.186 The
property owner in Peck had created various trusts to benefit his wife
and, upon her death, the children of their blended marriage; he
appointed himself original trustee of the trust, named his wife
successor trustee, and transferred to the trust certain items of
tangible personal property.187 The trust agreement contained what
was called a “share-cancellation” provision, disinheriting any bene-
ficiary who “institute[d] any action to challenge the provisions of the
trusts established by [the] document, or to attack the validity of
such trusts, or to remove [his wife] as Trustee, or question her ac-
tions as Trustee.”188
After the decedent died, his wife sold the artwork for nearly $4
million, and the decedent’s daughter sued, claiming that her father,
by means of two letters, had allocated the artwork to the daughter’s
trust share.189 The daughter also sought a trust accounting and al-
leged that the wife had breached various duties as trustee.190 The
trial court sided with the wife, finding that “there was no eviden-
tiary support that [she] acted in bad faith or reckless indifference
with regard to her trust duties, and thus [the daughter] forfeited her
interests in the trust through the share-cancellation provision.”191
The Arkansas appellate court refused to review the underlying is-
sue of whether the trust allocated the valuable artwork to the
daughter. The appellate court agreed, however, that the daughter,
by virtue of her challenges to the wife’s conduct, had forfeited her
interests in the trust regardless of the underlying merits of her
claim.192 In so holding, the court rejected the daughter’s argument
that a challenge to a fiduciary’s conduct did not constitute a “con-
test” that could trigger forfeiture.193 Because the language of the
186. Id. at 803. 
187. Id. at 798-99.
188. Id. at 802. 
189. Id. at 799. She also argued that her father had made a valid inter vivos gift of the
artwork to her directly, although this claim did not impact the trust forfeiture clause. Id. The
court found that the daughter had failed to prove all of the elements of an inter vivos gift. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 802-03.
193. Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court had previously held that a beneficiary’s challenge
to an executor’s decision to sell estate assets did not trigger forfeiture, but the provision at
issue in that case “only prohibited attacks upon the will.” Id. at 803.
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“share-cancellation” clause in the decedent’s trust was broadly writ-
ten and expressly applied to questions involving trustee conduct, the
court reasoned, the daughter forfeited any claim to the artwork
because her “allegations questioned [her stepmother’s] actions as
trustee and asked the court to control [those] actions as trustee.”194
Moreover, although the cancellation provision did not specify wheth-
er it would be triggered if the complaining beneficiary’s grievances
turned out to be well founded (and therefore helpful to the trust’s
ongoing administration),195 the court’s refusal to review those under-
lying questions implied that forfeiture would occur regardless of
whether the trustee’s actions were improper.196
The final case that bears discussion is a procedurally complex
2013 case from New Hampshire,197 Shelton v. Tamposi,198 which led
to the complete disinheritance of a daughter whose litigious conduct
was found to have violated a narrow no-contest provision that ex-
plicitly purported not to “preclude any beneficiary from enforcing,
by litigation or otherwise, ... the trustee’s duties.”199 Shelton involved
sizable trusts created by the patriarch of a large New England fam-
194. Id.
195. Id. at 802.
196. Id. at 803.
197. New Hampshire’s approach is noteworthy because the state has created a separate
trust court and is becoming known for its trust expertise. See Nadine M. Catalfimo & Charles
A. DeGrandpre, Closing the Loopholes: New Laws for “In Terrorem” (No Contest) Clauses in
Wills and Trusts, 52 N.H.B.J. 16, 16 (2011) (“The legislature has made a commitment to be
the ‘most attractive legal environment ... for trusts and fiduciary services’ by making an
‘attractive legal and financial environment for individuals and families seeking to establish
and locate their trusts and investment assets’ to New Hampshire.”) (citations omitted); Todd
D. Mayo, New Hampshire Establishes Dedicated Trust Court, N.H. TR. COUNCIL (Dec. 12,
2013), http://www.nhtrustcouncil.com/2013/12/12/new-hampshire-establishes-dedicated-trust-
court/ [http://perma.cc/5NSU-F4PJ] (“In announcing its decision to create the trust court, the
judicial branch cited New Hampshire’s stature as a leading trust jurisdiction within the
nation and the growing trust-related activity that is taking place within the state. With the
formation of the trust court, New Hampshire will be the first state in the nation with a
specialty court dedicated to complex trust and estate litigation.”).
198. 62 A.3d 741 (N.H. 2013) [hereinafter Shelton Supreme Court]. The trial court decision
can be found at Shelton v. Tamposi, 2010 N.H. Super. LEXIS 78 (Aug. 18, 2010) [hereinafter
Shelton Trial Court]. Betty later brought a malpractice claim against her trustee, the trustee’s
lawyer, and the lawyer’s Chicago-based law firm, alleging that their negligence and other
misconduct led to the forfeiture of her interest in the trust assets. See Tamposi v. Denby, 974
F. Supp. 2d 51 (D. Mass. 2013) [hereinafter Shelton Malpractice Action]. 
199. Shelton Trial Court, 210 N.H. Super. Lexis 78, at *67.
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ily to benefit his six children and their respective descendants.200
The trusts, which were eventually consolidated and referred to as
the SAT Sr. Trust,201 were governed by an agreement that named
two of the six children as “investment directors”202 and named first
a corporate trustee and then, through amendments, a presumably
independent individual as trustee.203 The investment directors were
responsible for all investment management decisions, and the re-
maining trustee of each child’s trust was responsible for deciding
when, and in what amounts, to distribute assets to the benefici-
aries.204 To effectuate the investments, the directors were allowed
to hold and manage the undivided interests (consisting primarily of
real estate investments but also a sizable stake in the Boston Red
Sox), distributing income from those interests and other cash to the
separate trusts when they felt it was economically sound to do so.
The trustees would then, at their discretion, distribute available
funds to the beneficiaries. In other words, the trust agreement split
the trust’s management function and its distribution function. It
was a challenge to this unusual structure—and the respective fidu-
ciaries’ powers under it—that resulted in a daughter being disinher-
ited pursuant to a forfeiture clause that prohibited any person from
commencing or joining an action seeking to “set aside or declare[ ]
invalid or to contest any and all of the provisions included in ... this
trust.”205
200. Shelton Supreme Court, 62 A.3d at 744 (“In its final form, [the trust] specified that
after [the settlor’s] death, the trust corpus was to be divided into twelve separate trusts for
each of his children and their issue (sibling trusts); six trusts contained assets exempt from
the federal generation skipping transfer tax and six contained non-exempt assets.”). Although
the settlor’s wife survived him, she was not a beneficiary and in fact was described as a
peacekeeper who refused to make tuition payments unless and until a dissenting child
reconciled with her siblings. Shelton Trial Court, 2010 N.H. Super. Lexis 78, at *25, *35.
201. See Shelton Supreme Court, 62 A.3d at 744-45. 
202. Neither son received compensation for his trust-related services other than what each
received through his work for the family companies. Shelton Trial Court, 2010 N.H. Super.
LEXIS 78, at *16-17.
203. Id. at *2-3.
204. Articles Fifth and Sixth authorized the trustee to “pay to or for the benefit of the child
... such amounts from the net income and principal of the trust and in such proportions among
them as the trustee considers necessary for education and maintenance in health and
reasonable comfort.” Shelton Supreme Court, 62 A.3d at 747.
205. Shelton Trial Court, 2010 N.H. Super. LEXIS 78, at *7.
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The various Shelton litigations reveal the type of protracted and
expensive litigation that easily could have motivated the patriarch
to disinherit altogether the more meddlesome objects of his boun-
ty.206 The litigation that divested the beneficiary of her interest in
the trust and ultimately ended up in the New Hampshire Supreme
Court involved a claim that the investment directors, by deciding to
retain certain assets, were exceeding their powers and depriving the
trustee, charged with distributing assets, of any ability to do her job
because she was unable to exercise her discretion to make distribu-
tions to serve the beneficiaries’ cash needs.207 Finding that the
settlor intended the investment directors to have exclusive and full
“power and authority to direct the retention or sale of assets and to
direct the purchase of property with any principal cash reserves,”
the appellate court rejected the beneficiary’s claims that the
investment directors’ decision not to release assets to the trustees
was improper.208 Unfortunately, the appellate court did not opine on
whether the forfeiture clause was properly invoked because the
beneficiary opted to dismiss her appeal, in favor of a malpractice
206. Commencing in 2000, five years after the settlor’s death, two of the six siblings became
dissatisfied with aspects of the trust and filed a number of lawsuits, some of which resulted
in dismissal, others in mediation, and still others in settlement. Shelton Supreme Court, 62
A.3d at 745. A result of these extensive proceedings was that the dissenting beneficiaries were
given the option of selecting their own trustees who would decide when those beneficiaries
received distributions from their respective trusts. A second result was a magistrate judge’s
ruling that further lawsuits might trigger the forfeiture clause. Betty, one such beneficiary,
had particularly large cash flow needs because of her spending patterns, litigation costs, and
messy divorce expenses. Shelton Trial Court, 2010 N.H. Super. LEXIS 78, at *14-16. With the
help of a prominent Chicago-based estates attorney, Betty tried to engage an institutional
trustee but was unsuccessful. Id. at *18 (“None of those institutions was willing to act as
trustee for the [Betty] Trusts because there was not sufficient cash flow assured to compen-
sate for their services.”). She ultimately named Julie Shelton, a long-time friend and litigation
attorney, as trustee; Shelton “reluctantly” accepted the appointment, even though she had no
experience in trust matters. Id. at *18-19. Alleging that Shelton took a vexatious and litigious
approach to increasing the assets of Betty’s trust from the day she assumed office, without
doing a cost-benefit analysis of the litigation or considering the needs of beneficiaries other
than Betty, Betty subsequently sued her and her attorneys for legal malpractice, see Shelton
Malpractice Action, 974 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D. Mass. 2013), a matter that has not yet been
resolved. Betty withdrew her direct appeal of the forfeiture action when she filed the
malpractice claim. See id.
207. Shelton Trial Court, 2010 N.H. Super. LEXIS 78, at *40; see also Shelton Malpractice
Action, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
208. Shelton Supreme Court, 62 A.3d at 748.
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action in a different forum, and the court found that the trustee
lacked standing to contest the forfeiture ruling.209
What is really interesting about Shelton, though, is the tremen-
dous difficulty that the court, lawyers, and parties to the trust
shared in defining the nature of the beneficiary’s “contest.” The
probate court had previously ruled that as long as the beneficiaries
“did not attempt to challenge the validity of the trust or authenticity
of documents, but sought only to uphold fiduciary standards under
the trust and New Hampshire law, the [forfeiture] clause would not
be triggered.”210 Following a five-week trial, the court found enough
“bad faith” on the part of the beneficiary to support divesting the
daughter of her very valuable interest in the trust.211 In so doing,
the trial court acknowledged New Hampshire’s policy in favor of
respecting settlor intent212 but characterized the plaintiffs’ claims
as being grounded in trust design and validity rather than in
fiduciary duties.213 To justify this view, the court observed that the
beneficiary and trustee filed their contest too quickly to allow
sufficient opportunity to consider the fiduciaries’ decision making.214
On the other hand, the challenge questioned ongoing conduct by the
investment directors, which was not fully addressed by the trust
instrument, lay within the investment directors’ discretion, and
presumably would be subject to further discretion as the trust con-
tinued to hold and manage property over time. Accordingly, this
challenge went to the heart of the trust’s administration and there-
fore is difficult to distinguish from claims involving fiduciary con-
duct (or misconduct).215 Unfortunately, the beneficiary’s decision to
pursue her rights in a different forum meant that the appellate
court never reached the substantive issues. The malpractice action
209. Id. at 749-50.
210. Id. at 745; see also supra note 206.
211. Shelton Trial Court, 2010 N.H. Super. LEXIS 78, at *70 (“The court finds that in
bringing and prosecuting this litigation the petitioners have acted in bad faith.”).
212. Id. at *69.
213. Id. at *72-73 (rejecting petitioners’ contention that the “litigation concerns breaches
of fiduciary duty by the investment directors” and thus “afford[s] a free pass from the in
terrorem clause’s bite” because “[a]s early as August 2007, petitioners planned to bring litiga-
tion concerning the trust, prior to most or all of the breaches alleged in the petition and even
prior to introducing the new trustee to the investment directors or the former trustee”).
214. Id. at *69-73.
215. See infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
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against the trustee and her lawyer who recommended the claim as
being within the fiduciary duty exception to forfeiture, remains
pending.216 
These three appellate cases are not the only recent ones that
involve broad forfeiture clauses that seek to dissuade beneficiaries
from challenging trustee conduct.217 For a variety of reasons, how-
ever, many of these cases ended up not addressing the substantive
issue of the clauses’ enforceability.218 The rapidly rising popularity
216. The malpractice litigation is still in discovery; recently the court denied Shelton’s
motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction that would have
frozen the assets of various lawyers and their firm. See Memorandum and Order on the
Shelton Claimants’ Motion for the Entry of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injuction at 15, Shelton Malpractice Action, No. 2010-12283 (D. Mass Dec. 23, 2013). 
217. See, e.g., Hamel v. Hamel, 299 P.3d 278, 288-89 (Kan. 2013); Commonwealth Bank &
Tr. Co. v. Young, 361 S.W.3d 344, 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012); Hanselman v. Joseph Frank, No.
09-P-1490, 2010 WL 2507827, at *2 (Mass. Ct. App. June 23, 2010); In re Estate of Stan, 839
N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013); Rouner v. Wise, 446 S.W.3d 242, 260 (Mo. 2014);
Frakes v. Nay, 295 P.3d 94, 100 (Or. 2013); Wilson v. Dallas, 743 S.E.2d 746, 761 (S.C. 2013).
Like the cases discussed in the text, Hamel acknowledged the validity of a forfeiture clause
that disinherited any beneficiary who, among other things, “object[ed] in any manner to any
action taken or proposed to be taken in good faith by the Trustee under said trust or any
amendment to it.” 299 P.3d at 289. The disgruntled trust beneficiary, and sibling to the
trustees, had argued that enforcement of the forfeiture clause violated public policy because
his original action did not seek to question the validity of the trust instrument but only to
interpret and gain information about it. Id. at 288. The court responded by explaining that
Kansas law, which had long recognized no-contest clauses in wills and found no distinction
for trusts, simply applied a two-prong analysis without regard to public policy: whether the
beneficiary’s actions violated the express language of the clause, however expansive it might
be; and whether the beneficiary had probable cause to take those actions. Id. at 288-89. Thus,
even though the Hamel clause threatened to abrogate trustee duties, the court approved the
forfeiture clause; the court did not enforce the clause to disinherit this particular beneficiary,
though, because it found that the beneficiary had probable cause to mount the challenge. Id. 
218. Some jurisdictions have implied a willingness to enforce broad forfeiture clauses
triggered by challenges to fiduciary decision making, but have not disinherited beneficiaries
because of the factual circumstances involved. See In re Dugan Revocable Living Tr., No.
60263, 2014 WL 549697, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 10, 2014) (relying on a no-contest clause that al-
lowed disinheritance of “any beneficiary who contested the trust or otherwise interfered with
the trust’s administration or distribution,” trustees sought to disinherit two beneficiaries
because the first failed “to promptly provide information regarding some of the trust’s assets”
and the second made “derogatory remarks towards the Trustees [that] interfered with the
trust’s administration”; the commissioner appointed by probate court disagreed with trustees’
decision to invoke forfeiture clause; the Nevada Supreme Court found commissioner acted
properly in reviewing trustees’ exercise of discretion but refused to disinherit beneficiaries
because their conduct, although annoying, did not interfere sufficiently with the trust’s
administration); Frakes, 295 P.3d at 100-01 (construing a clause triggered by any beneficiary
who “contests in any court the validity of this trust or of deceased Trustor’s or beneficiary’s
last will or seeks to obtain an adjudication in any proceeding in any court of this trust, or any
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and appearance of these clauses, however, shows that they are
filling some need for trust creators.
C. The Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
Although the Uniform Probate Code has two sections addressing
“penalty clauses” in wills, the Uniform Trust Code deliberately has
no equivalent for trusts.219 Apart from Tennessee, described above,
states with legislation applicable to trust forfeiture clauses for the
most part do not appear to specifically address trust provisions trig-
gered by contests questioning fiduciary conduct.220 
The fifth “tentative draft” of section 96 of the Restatement (Third)
of Trusts, entitled “Exculpatory and No-Contest Clauses,” was last
revised in 2009 before the cases cited in this Article were decided.221
of its provisions” but refusing to address claim that clause was “void as against public policy
and unenforceable” because court found that clause was not triggered where the only person
who stood to lose out was the estate planning attorney personally and not the trust). Other
courts have construed broadly drafted clauses not to cover fiduciary decision making. See
Young, 361 S.W.3d at 348, 353 (construing forfeiture clause stating that any beneficiary who
“directly or indirectly, attempt[s] to contest or oppose the validity of this agreement, including
any amendments thereto, or commences or prosecutes any legal proceedings to set aside this
agreement ... forfeit[s] his or her share, cease[s] to have any right or interest in the trust prop-
erty, and shall be deemed to have predeceased me” and finding that beneficiaries’ pleadings,
which challenged trustee decision making, did not “seek to invalidate any term in the trust
document” but rather sought “construction” of those terms); In re Estate of Thomas, 28 So. 3d
627, 638 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming trial court’s conclusion that the purpose of a broadly
worded forfeiture clause was “to discourage the beneficiaries from contesting the Will, not
challenging the administration of the Estate or the Trusts—which is what [the] Complaint
does” because “[t]o hold otherwise, would mean that an Executor and/or a Trustee is free to
spend a decedent’s money without accountability to anyone”). And still other courts have inter-
preted narrow forfeiture clauses expansively to encompass challenges to fiduciary conduct.
See Estate of Stan, 839 N.W.2d at 504-05 (finding that a challenge to fiduciary appointment
and fiduciary misconduct was equivalent to challenging the validity of a document but
refusing to disinherit beneficiary who had probable cause to pursue the challenge).
219. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-517, 3-905 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“Penalty Clause for
Contest”); Challis, supra note 127, at 518 (“The Uniform Trust Code contains no specific pro-
vision addressing the enforceability of no contest clauses in Trusts. It appears that this
decision was intentional, and this provision was omitted after discussion and consideration
by the Uniform Laws Commissioners.”).
220. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3329 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.235
(West 2014); see also Donkin v. Donkin, 314 P.3d 780, 787-91, 797 n.15 (Cal. 2013) (discussing
evolution of California’s statute). 
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009).
The section provides in full as follows:
(1) A provision in the terms of a trust that relieves a trustee of liability for
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Section 96, which had no equivalent in the Second Restatement,
addresses trust forfeiture clauses in the same provision as it ad-
dresses clauses that exculpate trustees from liability, explaining in
the general comments that both are “commonly used types of trust
provisions” that have the effect of insulating trustees from liability
or “from litigation over trust administration.”222 More specifically,
section 96(1) enforces such an exculpatory clause so long as it was
freely negotiated, applies only to negligent (not bad faith) conduct,
and does not relieve the trustee of “accountability for profits” deriv-
ing from the breach.223 Section 96(2) bars enforcement of any for-
feiture clause “to the extent that doing so would interfere with the
enforcement or proper administration of the trust.”224 
The comments and reporter’s notes first describe the reasons for
placing both substantive and procedural limits on the enforcement
of exculpatory clauses.225 Complete exoneration of a trustee for mis-
conduct that exceeds negligence, the notes explain, undermines “the
definition and essence of a trust as a ‘fiduciary relationship’” and
arguably renders the trust invalid.226 Because “a private trust, its
breach of trust, and that was not included in the instrument as a result of the
trustee’s abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, is enforceable except
to the extent that it purports to relieve the trustee
(a) of liability for a breach of trust committed in bad faith or with
indifference to the fiduciary duties of the trustee, the terms or purposes of
the trust, or the interests of the beneficiaries, or
(b) of accountability for profits derived from a breach of trust.
(2) A no-contest clause may not be enforced to the extent that doing so would
interfere with the enforcement or proper administration of the trust.
Id. No comparable provision appeared in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts. Id. (reporter’s
notes). 
222. Id. § 96 cmt. a. 
223. Id. § 96(1). 
224. Id. § 96(2). 
225. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
226. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmts. b-c, reporter’s notes (AM. LAW INST., Ten-
tative Draft No. 5, 2009) (quoting id. § 27(2) and UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2006)); see also BOGERT ET AL., supra note 13, § 973 (A settlor “who attempts to create a trust
without any accountability in the trustee is contradicting himself. A trust necessarily grants
rights to the beneficiary that are enforceable in equity.... [If] the settlor really intended [to
create] a trust, it would seem that accountability ... must inevitably follow”); David Hayton,
The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 47, 58-
61 (A.J. Oakley ed., 1996); Langbein, supra note 3, at 1123-25; Leslie, supra note 94, at 2752
(“[C]lassic fiduciary rules” that evolved over time “to compensate for information asymmetries
and market imperfections” should not be weakened by statute in order to accommodate non-
professional trustees, because courts already offer them “adequate protection” without such
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terms, and its administration must be for the benefit of its beneficia-
ries,” courts, legislatures, scholars, and other commentators have
agreed that trustees cannot be exculpated from meeting certain
standards of liability.227 The procedures required to enforce an
exculpatory clause ensure this result, for example, by placing the
burden of establishing validity of the clause on the trustee as the
party with superior knowledge and sophistication; the trustee must
show that the settlor wanted to include the exculpatory clause in
order to shield the trustee from unnecessary and vexatious claims
of negligence by the beneficiaries.228 If the clause satisfies both the
substantive and procedural standards, then it will be enforced.
In contrast to this balanced approach toward exculpatory clauses,
which considers how the provision came to appear in a particular
trust instrument, the Restatement imposes an absolute prohibition
on forfeiture clauses that purport to disinherit beneficiaries who
contest fiduciary decision making.229 In support of this ban, the Re-
statement refers to public policy and the same rationales applied to
exculpatory clauses.230 The comments further explain that this rule
“ordinarily” makes an otherwise valid no-contest clause “unenforce-
legislation); Leslie, supra note 92, at 106-07 (“Although ... [most] courts routinely announce
that exculpatory clauses are enforceable, in reality, courts tend to shield the trustee from
liability only in four situations: ... (2) the trustee is a non-professional or uncompensated; (3)
the [provision relates to a] ... direction that the trustee retain specific, relatively risky
investments.”).
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmts. b-c, reporter’s notes (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009) (quoting id. and UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
228. Factors to be considered in determining “whether an exculpatory clause was included
in the trust instrument as a result of an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship” may
include:
whether the instrument was drawn by the trustee or another acting wholly or
in part on behalf of the trustee; whether the trustee prior to or at the time of the
trust’s creation had been in a fiduciary relationship to the settlor, such as by
serving as the settlor’s conservator or as the settlor’s lawyer in providing the
trust instrument or relevant part(s) of it; whether the settlor received
competent, independent advice regarding the provisions of the instrument;
whether the settlor was made aware of the exculpatory provision and was, with
whatever guidance may have been provided, able to understand and make a
judgment concerning the clause; and the extent and reasonableness of the
provision.
Id. § 96 cmt. d. 
229. Id. § 96 cmt. e.
230. Id.
504 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:455
able to prevent or punish” a beneficiary who sues if the clause
“would inhibit beneficiaries’ enforcement of their rights under a
trust (whether created by the will or other instrument) or would
otherwise undermine the effective, proper administration of the
trust.”231 The reporter’s notes justify blanket nonenforcement by
rationalizing that actions to enforce trustee duties often effectuate
settlor intent and so are not “contests” but are more in the nature
of construction proceedings.232 What neither the text of the ban nor
the accompanying comments address—and what becomes clear from
clauses in the newer cases like Shaheen, Peck, Bradley, and others—
is that settlors are using express language to manifest just such
intent that any beneficiary who disagrees with trust management
and trustee decision making loses her inheritance.233 It is thus
disingenuous at best to cite “settlor intent” as the reason for a rule
barring enforcement of these clauses.
Although Section 96(2) makes no distinction between contests
that have merit and those that do not, the reporter’s notes recognize
that there will be the “occasional” case when the settlor “is con-
cerned that certain disappointed or difficult beneficiaries might
pursue unwarranted and unreasonable litigation against a trust-
ee.”234 In response to these “extreme circumstances,” the notes
recognize, courts might either “assess litigation costs” or enforce the
forfeiture clauses.235 Thus, like other Restatement provisions that
contradict a rule’s clear directive with a conflicting explanation, the
231. Id. The comment goes on to list the types of actions that would not “ordinarily” trigger
forfeiture, including: 
a beneficiary’s petition for instructions (§ 71, even though, for example, it seeks
an interpretation contrary to the trustee’s interpretation ...); a demand for or
challenge to a trustee’s accounting (§ 83); a suit to enjoin or redress a breach of
trust (§ 95); a petition for removal of a trustee for unfitness or for repeated or
serious breach of trust (§ 37); a suit alleging that a trustee’s particular exercise
of discretion or even “absolute” discretion constituted an abuse of discretion
(§ 87); or the like.
Id. Provisions that would give rise to forfeiture, the comments state, are addressed “compre-
hensively” in section 8.5 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers. Id.
232. Id. § 96 cmt. e, reporter’s notes. 
233. Id.; see supra notes 124-28, 139-64, 174-96 and accompanying text.
234. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmt. e, reporter’s notes (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009). 
235. Id.
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notes and comments reverse the text.236 To temper this confusing
guidance, the Reporter recommends that enforcement of forfeiture
clauses that question fiduciary conduct should occur only when ac-
tions by a beneficiary “are so frivolous and burdensome that the
court can reasonably conclude that unwarranted harassment is
involved and that the forfeiture will enhance rather than impair
proper administration and will better protect the interests of the
other beneficiaries.”237 
IV. MUST TRUST FORFEITURE CLAUSES FORFEIT TRUST?
As Part III makes clear, settlors appear increasingly likely to
include forfeiture clauses in their trust agreements. To date, draft-
ers, courts, legislatures, and reformers have not paid much atten-
tion to these clauses, assuming that they would function like their
testamentary counterparts. But the differences between how trusts
and wills operate mean that trust forfeiture clauses are fundamen-
tally different than their narrower testamentary counterparts. This
Part proposes a way to treat trust forfeiture clauses to preserve
settlor intent without forfeiting fiduciary accountability. Because so
many of the cases described in this Article resulted from aggressive
estate planning, estate planners must think about how and when it
is appropriate to use trust forfeiture clauses rather than just
including them in trust agreements as the latest variety of drafting
defaults. Accordingly, this Part first argues that not every trust
should contain a forfeiture clause because the goals that property
owners are seeking to achieve often are not served, and even may be
undermined, by these seemingly innocuous provisions. Second,
courts and legislatures should consider an approach to these clauses
that balances the need to keep trustees accountable, as seen in the
public policy cases, against the property owner’s interest in discour-
aging claims by litigious beneficiaries, as seen in the forfeiture
236. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 10-5
(Teacher’s Manual 2013) (“This is yet another example of a regrettably common structure in
[the Restatement (Third)] whereby the rule is X unless it is not X.”); cf. Leslie, supra note 94,
at 2751 (describing how UTC comments “gut the protections provided for by the Code’s black
letter”). 
237. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmt. e, reporter’s notes (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009).
506 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:455
cases. The final Section of this Part therefore uses the text and
comments of the draft Restatement to propose procedural safe-
guards that would allow trust forfeiture clauses, like exculpatory
clauses, to be enforced, but only in certain narrow circumstances.
A. Drafting Considerations
The most obvious reaction to reading recent trust forfeiture cases
is that including a broad forfeiture clause in estate planning
documents as a protective measure may increase, rather than
diminish, the likelihood of litigation. Drafters should avoid includ-
ing such clauses as boilerplate in every estate planning document
and instead should seek to determine the precise problem that the
settlor is anticipating and hoping to prevent. Although the settlor
may desire to shield her chosen fiduciaries from having to spend
time and trust resources defending their conduct, that intent may
not extend to opportunist fiduciaries (or even lazy ones). The
planner should therefore determine whether the settlor is motivated
by a general apprehension of any litigation at all, a stubborn belief
in the absolute discretion of her fiduciaries, or a desire to moderate
between the discretion afforded to the fiduciaries and the good faith
and judgment of the beneficiaries and their advisors.238 Expressing
in the trust agreement, or even in a memorandum of guidance to the
trustee, how and when to apply and enforce the forfeiture clauses
would be helpful.239
If a settlor is motivated by one or more particularly meddlesome
or litigious beneficiaries with “a tendency to behave irrationally,”
there are more effective and less controversial ways to plan for such
a beneficiary than using a broad forfeiture clause.240 For example,
the settlor might consider funding a separate trust for that benefi-
238. See Challis, supra note 127, at 502-05.
239. See Deborah S. Gordon, Letters Non-Testamentary, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 585, 592-93
(2014); Gordon, supra note 20, at 382.
240. Leslie, supra note 92, at 102; see also Browder, Re-Examined, supra note 10, at 329
(“The inveterate trouble-maker, who all too often will emerge with petty and frivolous conten-
tions to incite family animosities and waste his benefactor’s estate at no risk of personal loss,
remains to be dealt with.”); Leavitt, supra note 6, at 65-66 (describing how forfeiture clauses
may be more likely to dissuade those with real claims and less likely to deter “litigious
troublemakers”).
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ciary and allowing her to serve as trustee, or co-trustee, of that trust
so that she is involved in the decision-making processes herself.
Trustee selection, too, is essential to avoiding conflict. Naming a
family member who has natural antipathies towards particular
beneficiaries or a professional who has had more interaction with
“favored” beneficiaries will increase the likelihood of litigation and
should be avoided. Drafters also might include a mediation clause
in the trust agreement,241 or require a beneficiary to pay any costs
associated with trust litigation rather than allowing them to request
that those costs be paid by the trust.242 Finally, if the jurisdiction is
one that allows (or does not reject) expansive forfeiture clauses di-
rected at contests other than those concerning document validity, at
the very least the clause should address (and therefore put the
beneficiary on notice about) whether forfeiture still kicks in if the
beneficiary’s challenge succeeds but the document otherwise
stands.243
B. A Proposal for Enforcing Trust Forfeiture Clauses: Using
Exculpatory Clause Law as a Model
Rather than prohibiting enforcement of trust forfeiture clauses
altogether, as the text of the current draft Restatement,244 Tennes-
see statute,245 and public policy cases246 do, courts and legislatures
might instead look to existing law governing exculpatory clauses for
guidance about how to adopt a more balanced approach. It is no sur-
prise that the Restatement deals with these two types of clauses in
a single section because, although they serve somewhat different
goals and thus are not perfect substitutes for each other,247 both ex
241. See Love & Sterk, supra note 10, at 569-71 (discussing how mediation clauses, like for-
feiture clauses, decrease litigation and publicity but have the added advantages of raising less
suspicion from courts while applying to broader categories of disputes). 
242. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 13, § 871 n.55 (noting examples of circumstances under
which courts have required beneficiaries to pay costs associated with trust litigation).
243. See supra note 29. 
244. See supra Part III.C.
245. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 134-66 and accompanying text.
247. Exculpatory clauses do not provide the beneficiary with the same incentive to forgo
litigation that a forfeiture clause does. If a trust contains an exculpatory clause but not a for-
feiture clause, a contestant’s risk is less because she will not lose her beneficial interest by
508 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:455
culpatory clauses and trust forfeiture clauses are intended to make
a fiduciary’s job smoother (and more desirable) and both impact
trustee accountability.248 By refusing to enforce exculpatory clauses
unless they meet substantive and procedural guidelines, courts are
able to balance a settlor’s desire to shield her trustee against the
beneficiaries’ interests in policing that trustee’s conduct.249 
Substantively, courts should view forfeiture clauses that apply to
fiduciary conduct with caution, recognizing that these clauses differ
from traditional forfeiture clauses that apply to document validity.
In fact, for the reasons set forth in the public policy cases, any for-
feiture that purports to disinherit a beneficiary who challenges
trustee decision making should be presumed invalid, but the inquiry
should not simply end there. Although the Restatement prohibits
forfeiture clauses that are triggered by such challenges, it recog-
nizes, albeit only in the notes and comments, that certain extreme
behaviors by overly litigious beneficiaries should nevertheless result
in forfeiture.250 Incorporating this hidden recognition into the rule
by using a burden-shifting approach would better meet the compet-
ing interests of settlor, trustee, and beneficiaries.251 In other words,
filing the contest. Her only risk is that she ultimately may be unable to recover damages from
the trustee, thereby wasting the beneficiary’s time and the trust’s resources. This risk, how-
ever, is the same risk attendant to any litigation. 
248. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 102-09, 222-28 and accompanying text; see also Leslie, supra note 94,
at 2746-52.
250. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text. Indeed, even jurisdictions that refuse
on public policy grounds to enforce forfeiture clauses triggered by challenges to fiduciary con-
duct still recognize the valid interest in preventing vexatious litigation. See, e.g., Donkin v.
Donkin, 314 P.3d 780, 788 (Cal. 2013) (“[N]o contest clauses are still supported by a number
of important public policy interests, including respecting a transferor’s ability to control the
use and disposition of his or her own property and to avoid the cost, delay, public exposure,
and additional discord between beneficiaries involved in litigation over the transferor’s estate
plan.”); Di Portanova v. Monroe, 402 S.W.3d 711, 715 (Tex. App. 2012) (“In terrorem clauses
are designed to dissuade beneficiaries from filing vexatious litigation, particularly as among
family members, that might thwart the intent of the grantor.”).
251. Professor David Horton agrees that procedural considerations are important and has
proposed an alternative approach to trust law generally, and to no-contest clauses in particu-
lar, by suggesting that courts apply the contractual concept of “unconscionability” to deter-
mine whether a no-contest clause should be enforced. Horton, supra note 10, at 1732-34. He
explains that unconscionability, unlike the “public policy rule,” “would interject procedural
considerations into the analysis,” allowing courts to uphold clauses that reflect a property-
owner’s “strongly felt” and “case-specific” preferences. Id. at 1734. Although he specifically
exempts “no-contest clauses that apply to breach of trust allegations and thus require unwa-
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a reviewing court would allow the trustee (or any other party who
has an interest in the trust) to rebut the presumption of invalidity
by proving that (a) the settlor included the clause to address a
particular concern, rather than simply as boilerplate and (b) the
purpose for which the clause was included is, in fact, occurring.252 As
is true for exculpatory clauses, imposing this burden on the trustee,
who often has superior knowledge and sophistication, helps protect
the beneficiaries.253 Once the party hoping to enforce the forfeiture
clause has fulfilled these procedural requirements, however, the
burden would then shift back to the beneficiary to prove that she
had “probable cause” to challenge the trustee’s decision making.254
In practice, a settlor who anticipated that a particular beneficiary
(or class of beneficiaries) might contest a fiduciary’s decision making
would be expected to so indicate, either in the forfeiture clause or
otherwise;255 if the trustee could show that the beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries had complained in the past, as, for example, what happened
(repeatedly) in Shelton,256 the court would apply the expansive
forfeiture clause to sever the complaining beneficiary’s interest
unless the beneficiary proved that she had probable cause to
challenge the trustee’s decision making or, alternatively, unless the
beneficiary prevailed and showed that the trustees had violated one
or more duties. 
Although this burden-shifting approach is admittedly more
complex than a complete rejection or approval of a trust forfeiture
clause, it has three main advantages over those more simplistic
analyses: first, it acknowledges all of the interests involved in the
trust relationship, including those of settlor, trustee, and beneficia-
ries; second, it accounts for the trust parties’ ongoing interactions;
and third, it provides greater predictability. 
First, the burden-shifting approach described above recognizes
the traditional rationales for enforcing forfeiture clauses: incentiviz-
vering adherence to the trustee’s decisions,” id., an unconscionability approach could apply
equally effectively to that category of contests. 
252. Although the appropriate standard of proof is important to consider, that issue is a
subject for another day. 
253. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra notes 197-216 and accompanying text. 
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ing harmony and ensuring compliance with the property owner’s
donative intent.257 Moreover, it recognizes that forfeiture clauses of
any type give the beneficiaries some degree of power and choice over
their property, which is more than the beneficiaries would have had
had they been disinherited altogether.258 Finally, by imposing limits
on the enforceability of these clauses, this approach recognizes that
trusts only function well when “faithless fiduciaries” are subject to
oversight.259 In this way, it also serves the property owner who is
unlikely to have placed the property in trust in the first place had
she not wanted to impose some level of fiduciary duties on the
trustee.260
Second, this approach takes into account the trust parties’ on-
going interactions. In contrast to forfeiture clauses directed at docu-
ment validity, forfeiture clauses that apply to fiduciary decision
making can be triggered at any time during the life of the trust,
including many years after the trust comes into existence. If a forfei-
ture clause applies without any procedural safeguards, a beneficiary
risks her inheritance every time she questions whether a trustee
has responded appropriately to changes in circumstances that the
settlor could not have anticipated.261 Consider the contestants in
Shaheen262 and Peck263 whose beneficial interests in their respective
trusts were terminated the first time they called into question their
respective trustees’ conduct. In Peck, this result ensued regardless
of outcome, and in Shaheen, it ensued notwithstanding the existence
257. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text; see also Engelhardt, supra note 10, at
542 (describing reasons for forfeiture clauses, including “protect[ing] the grantor’s wishes,”
“avoid[ing] litigation,” and “plac[ing] an absolute limit on a beneficiary’s interest in assets”).
258. See Browder, supra note 4, at 1074 (“[I]f a testator is willing to trust the judgment and
integrity of his executors in the management of his estate and to free them from responsibility
to his beneficiaries, that too should be his privilege. Any conditions inserted to compel the
beneficiaries to respect his wishes should be enforced.”); Leslie, supra note 92, at 102 (noting
that use of forfeiture clauses in trusts to deter beneficiaries from mounting “nuisance suits 
... might be criticized for its potential to deter meritorious suits” but explaining that “at least
a no-contest clause preserves some incentive for a trustee to exercise reasonable care”).
259. Bradley v. Gilbert, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680, 688 (Ct. App. 2009). 
260. On occasion, trustees may use these clauses as swords, rather than shields, an
approach that does not serve the settlor’s interest in avoiding litigation. See, e.g., In re Dugan
Revocable Living Tr., No. 60263, 2014 WL 549697 (Nev. Feb. 10, 2014). 
261. For a discussion of trustee discretion, see generally Halbach, supra note 96, and
Krasilovsky, supra note 95.
262. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 185-96 and accompanying text. 
2015] FORFEITING TRUST 511
of other meritorious claims. The burden-shifting approach is unlike-
ly to lead to forfeiture the first time a beneficiary complains. Thus,
a clause like the one in Bradley,264 which was designed to cut off
challenges by children who might resent their father’s shifted af-
fections, would not result in forfeiture; the property owner’s desire
to control potentially meddlesome beneficiaries and insulate his leg-
acy would give way to the recognition that fiduciary duties, and the
beneficiary’s right to enforce them, are essential to trust relation-
ships.265 
Third, the burden-shifting approach would provide notice to the
beneficiaries and their advisors of the potential risks of litigation,
thereby solving another problem, which arose in the Shelton case,
concerning the difficulty of predicting when a challenge involves
fiduciary conduct as opposed to construction of a trust’s terms.266
Recall that the Shelton forfeiture clause expressly did not apply to
challenges to fiduciary conduct.267 The trust beneficiary’s argument
was that the trust’s “investment directors” were acting improperly
by not releasing trust assets to the trustees, because that decision
meant that the investment directors, rather than the trustees,
controlled trust distributions.268 The New Hampshire trial court
held that the challenge triggered the forfeiture clause, reasoning
that the beneficiary was contesting the terms of the document,
rather than trustee decision making, because she brought the
challenge before the investment directors had actually made many
decisions.269 In fact, though, the hierarchy and relationships among
the fiduciaries, and the decisions that drove those relationships,
were precisely the point of contention. That this argument involved
the terms of the document, rather than fiduciary conduct, would
have been difficult for any advisor to predict and ultimately led to
a second layer of litigation, including a malpractice action against
264. See supra notes 138-61 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 207-16 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
269. See Shelton Trial Court, No. 316-2007-EQ-2109, 2010 N.H. Super. LEXIS 78 at *69-73
(Aug. 18, 2010); see also In re Estate of Stan, 839 N.W.2d 498, 504-05 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013)
(finding challenge to fiduciary appointment equivalent to challenge to validity of the document
or one of its terms but refusing to disinherit beneficiary because she had probable cause to
object to sister’s appointment and subsequent conduct). 
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the trustee and the attorney who had reached the wrong conclusion
and caused the client to lose her multi-million dollar legacy.270
Conversely, consider the conduct being challenged in Bradley, which
just as easily could have been styled as a challenge to the terms of
the rewritten survivor’s trust, rather than to the trustee’s conduct,
and possibly would have survived.271 Allowing forfeiture clauses
triggered by challenges to trustee conduct, but imposing strict pro-
cedural guidelines on the clauses’ enforceability, would help avoid
this problem.
In short, any well-reasoned approach to trust forfeiture clauses
cannot simply equate them with traditional forfeiture clauses and
blindly apply the same analysis. Using a more balanced, albeit more
complex, approach acknowledges the essential component of trust
law that enables a beneficiary to keep her trustees accountable but
also provides a procedure by which forfeiture clauses would serve
their goal of making beneficiaries carefully consider the downsides
of litigation. 
CONCLUSION
Whatever can be said about the forfeiture clauses that appear in
the recent cases discussed in this Article, each clause reflects the
respective trust creator’s desire to confer a legacy of sustained,
functioning, and non-litigious interactions among the parties to the
trust relationship. In other words, these increasingly popular claus-
es are evidence of property owners’ continuing distaste for lawsuits
that not only drain precious assets from the settlors’ legacies but
also disrupt ongoing family relationships and expose those relation-
ships to the public. Courts, legislatures, and planners struggle with
balancing these legitimate goals against the trust beneficiaries’ (and
inheritance system’s) obligation to police trustee conduct—not to
forfeit the very trust reposed in these fiduciaries. Recognizing these
compelling interests and striking a balance between them requires
attention not only from those people responsible for designing the
documents but also from those responsible for their administration,
including courts and legislatures. 
270. See supra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 138-61 and accompanying text.
